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Introduction
Summer in Alaska has another name to locals: road construction. Between the
widespread construction zones that can keep traffic halted for up to thirty minutes at a time and
the hundreds of massive RVs that creep along the scenic highways oblivious to the dozens of
cars inching along behind waiting, frustrated, for an opportunity to pass, road trips during
Alaska’s tourist season are a chancy proposition. For an unwilling participant in one of these
summer convoys, heading north on the Richardson Highway as it approaches the junction with
the Alaska Highway that gives the town of Delta Junction its name, it would be easy to miss the
low brown sign that is the only indicator of the presence of Fort Greely. A driver could be
distracted by the Delta River on the other side of the road as it meanders through its many
channels on its way to meet the Tanana River a few miles ahead, or by the stunning vista of the
Alaska Range, dominated by the triple peak of Mt. Hayes, that commands the horizon in the
rear-view mirror. But behind the low screen of spruce and birch trees that blocks the fort from
the eyes of passing motorists lies an Army base that has been highly significant to American
defense.
The tourists that clog Alaskan roads and the oil pipeline that crosses Fort Greely’s land
now dominate the economy of the 49th state, but for many decades, the military provided both
the majority of Alaskan economic development and its relevance to the national spotlight. Fort
Greely, incubated in World War II and birthed alongside the Cold War, had its destiny and
mission intertwined with an ideological struggle that brought millions of dollars and thousands
of men to the Alaskan territory.1 The end of that struggle, for a time, spelled the end of the
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military’s reliance on Fort Greely, and for six years the base was nearly deserted and Fort Greely
almost ceased to exist.
During that period of limbo, the Army financed an inventory and evaluation of the
military structures at the base to consider their qualification for possible historical preservation
under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.2 The report presented paints a stark picture
of historical insignificance for every building on the base, systematically considering and then
dismissing any possible contributions the buildings or the events that took place around them
might have played in national history. Considering the base’s World War II era activities, the
report concludes, “Nineteen of the 20 buildings [constructed during World War II] are ancillary
facilities that did not have a major role in any historic events or technological developments of
World War II. In addition, they are not associated with any historically significant persons, do
not embody the distinctive characteristics of a type or method of construction, and are limited in
their ability to yield data important to history.”3
Considering the Cold War-era buildings, and by extension the Cold War contributions of
the base, the report is even more succinct and seemingly definitive: “All are architecturally
undistinguished ancillary facilities that did not have a major role in any historic events or
technological developments of the Cold War.”4 From these pronouncements comes the
impression that Fort Greely played no important role in either conflict, and that a discussion of
its history is a foregone conclusion. While no amazing architecture is to be found there, and few
distinguished names ever found their way to Delta Junction, from a careful study of Alaska’s
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Cold War history comes an understanding of a more subtle, yet still important role played by
these “undistinguished ancillary facilities.”
The limited number of scholarly works dealing with Alaska’s history and role in the Cold
War has lent credence to this view of Fort Greely, placing very little emphasis on the post. In
Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick’s general history of Alaska, Fort Greely merits only
one brief mention, with no explanation of why it existed or the purpose it was to play in the Cold
War.5 John Whitehead, in an essay on the importance of Alaska and Hawai’i as “Cold War
states,” gives emphasis to Alaska’s critical role in American military strategy in the Cold War,
but Fort Greely’s part in that again receives only the barest attention.6
Works that focus on the military in Alaska give significantly more discussion to Fort
Greely, including the third volume of Lyman L. Woodman’s exhaustive history of the Army in
Alaska. Woodman provides insights into different portions of the post’s history, but the
somewhat disorganized nature of his work obscures Fort Greely’s overall purpose and
contributions to the Cold War. An evaluation of Fort Greely’s status and significance as part of
Alaska’s Cold War heritage by Army historian D. Colt Denfeld acknowledges the importance of
several aspects of the fort’s history to the Cold War, but does not provide a complete picture of
Fort Greely’s contributions.7
From the critical role played by the first military post established at what was then known
as Big Delta in 1942 in the effort to provide desperately needed aircraft to the Soviet Union in
World War II, to the Army’s first dedicated cold weather training and testing facilities
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established soon after the war ended, to the ongoing mission of providing a theater for largescale war games as Cold War tensions gripped the nation, to the significant advancements in
Cold War science and technology that occurred within Greely’s boundaries, Fort Greely was a
site that was always shaped by U.S. relations with Alaska’s former owner, Russia. Through it’s
role in facilitating the transfer of Lend-Lease planes to Soviet pilots in World War II, providing a
home to train both individual soldiers and entire battalions to fight and survive in the Arctic, and
ensuring the progression of science and technology in a conflict that was driven by those forces,
Fort Greely shows the incredible impact that can come from even the most ancillary and
undistinguished group of buildings.

4

Chapter 1- World War II on the Last Frontier
Growing international tensions and the increased importance of air travel combined to
ensure increased scrutiny of Alaska in the years leading up to World War II. As early as 1934,
Anthony Dimond, Alaska’s non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives, noted Alaska’s
crucial position astride the great circle route from the United States to Asia,1 and warned
Congress of the growing threat posed by Japan to the largely undefended territory.2 In testimony
before Congress on February 12, 1935, former Brigadier General William Mitchell supported
Dimond, stating that Alaska was “the most important strategic place in the world.”3 Gen.
Mitchell, however was not voicing the opinion of many in Army circles, and a continued military
conviction that Alaska was not strategically important led to Congressional apathy, and
prevented any major military buildup in the territory until 1940, when serious military attention
finally focused on Alaska.4
When considering possible military action in Alaska, military planners decided to focus
on the creation of multiple, autonomous garrisons in the Aleutians and southern Alaska that
could each repel an enemy attack. Planners realized, however, that this plan would only be
feasible if there was a strong military aviation force available to support the ground forces.5
Therefore, General Simon B. Buckner, commander of Army troops in Alaska, advocated:
building advanced operating bases for bomber planes in western Alaska, including the
Aleutian chain; constructing auxiliary fields near the existing main bases to prevent the

1

Great circle routes are “the shortest course between two points on the surface of a sphere.”
Geometrically, they form a circle that includes the center of a sphere, thus splitting the sphere into two
equal halves. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "great circle route."
2
Claus-M. Naske and Herman E. Slotnick, Alaska: A History, 3rd ed. (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2011), 176.
3
Ibid., 177.
4
Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its
Outposts (Washington, DC: The Center for Military History, 1964), 224.
5
Ibid., 227.

5

undue massing of aircraft with consequent danger from bombing attack; connecting the
United States and Alaska by a chain of landing fields; developing intermediate bases to
facilitate the movement of aircraft to and within the territory; establishing an aircraft
warning service; and maintaining in the United States a reserve of both combat and
transport aircraft equipped for cold weather flying for the prompt reinforcement of
Alaska in an emergency.6
It was to provide for this that a feverish period of construction began on a series of airfields that
became known as the Northwest route, which would enable aircraft to make the long and
treacherous journey across Canada and Alaska to reach the military installations that were being
constructed and expanded. In December 1940, the Civilian Aeronautics Authority (CAA)
announced that work would begin on an airfield at Big Delta, a small community some eightyfive miles southeast of Fairbanks, which had grown around a ferry crossing on the Tanana River
and would ultimately be the endpoint of the Alaska-Canada Military Highway that was built to
follow the air route in 1942.7
The airfield at Big Delta, though initially a civilian project financed by the CAA, soon
came under the aegis of the Army Corps of Engineers as war with Japan threatened.8 By the end
of 1941, as the United States officially entered the war, two asphalt runways had been completed
at the Big Delta airfield, making it one of the better prepared sites along the air transport route
from Canada.9 Military preparations in Alaska received their first major test when, in June 1942,
Japanese ground forces made their only incursion onto North American soil through an invasion
of the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian chain. Though the Japanese never attempted to
advance beyond those remote holdings, American forces subsequently spent the next year
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engaging in an intense bombing campaign that eventually culminated in the May 1943 American
landing on Attu and the August invasion of Kiska.10
Though the campaign on Attu saw several weeks of intense fighting, it would not be in
direct combat that Alaska would see perhaps its most important role in the war. Instead, it was
through its unique position geographically in relation to the Soviet Union. Even before the Pearl
Harbor attack, President Franklin Roosevelt had stretched the limits of the definition of neutrality
by providing aid to Great Britain and France. In March 1941, Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease
Act, thereby permitting the United States to supply defense items to any country “whose defense
he deemed necessary to the defense of the United States.”11 Extending such aid to Britain was
controversial enough to many American isolationists, but the idea that such aid might eventually
go to the Soviet Union was unthinkable even for many who supported the aid to Britain.12
The Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Russo-Finnish War, and the Soviet annexation of the Baltic
States, combined with an American mistrust of communism, seriously hampered U.S.-Soviet
relations. However, only four days after the onslaught of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941
solidified the Soviets as enemies of Germany, Soviet ambassador Konstantin Umansky
approached Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles regarding the possibility of material aid in
their fight.13 Roosevelt soon declared his willingness to extend Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet
Union.14 Problems plagued the early months of this new relationship, and the limitations of pre-
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war footing American industry made it easier to promise aid than to actually deliver it. Any
planes, guns, and tanks that would be delivered to the Soviets would have to come at the expense
of America’s own rearmament and commitments to Britain.15 Even once items had been
manufactured, there remained the significant obstacle of transporting them to the Soviet Union.
Each of the three main sea routes presented enormous difficulty. The shortest route, from
Iceland to the ports of Murmansk or Archangel, was the most dangerous, as Nazi naval and air
forces in Norway constantly patrolled the frigid waters and sank dozens of transport ships on
their way to or from the ports.16 Another option, the lengthy route around the Cape of Good
Hope and up through the Persian Gulf to Iran, not only took significantly longer, but also was
hampered by inadequate unloading and transportation infrastructure to remove supplies from the
ships and move them across Iran to Russia.17 The journey across the Northern Pacific from the
American West Coast to Siberian ports was less risky, but after Pearl Harbor, only Soviet vessels
could make the voyage, and supplies still had to be transported the entire width of Russia before
they could reach Soviet forces fighting the Germans.18
Especially difficult to transport via ship were the planes the devastated Soviet Air Force
needed to combat the Luftwaffe. Shipped disassembled, the planes still had to be assembled
before they could be used.19 As early as August 1941, Americans had proposed a solution to the
problem of aircraft transport: flying the planes through Alaska and to airfields in Siberia, where
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Soviet pilots would take over.20 While the efficiency of this route was attractive to American
planners, it also had the added attraction of gaining U.S. pilots access to and familiarity with
Soviet air bases in Siberia, which could be useful against Japan.21 Such a possibility, however,
was precisely what the Soviets most feared in regards to Lend-Lease activities. Suspicious of
American motives, especially the suggestion that American pilots would gain entry to Siberia,
and unwilling to take any action that could lead to the loss of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Pact, the Soviets rejected the entire idea of the Alaskan route, with Stalin declaring that it was
“too dangerous a route” when U.S. special envoy Averill Harriman presented it to him in late
September 1941.22
The necessity of a more efficient delivery route, however, soon began to override
instinctive Soviet paranoia, and by October the Soviets had begun to prepare the air bases across
Siberia that would be required to make the Alaska-Siberia (ALSIB) air route a reality.23 On June
8, 1942, Soviet ambassador Maxime Litvinov reported to Washington that the Kremlin had
approved the ALSIB route. When Roosevelt communicated his hope to Stalin that the route
would also lead to further U.S.-Soviet military cooperation in the Far East against Japan,
including U.S. access to Siberian bases, Stalin’s reply made it clear that Soviet pilots would be
the only ones making the journey from Alaska to Siberia.24
Throughout the summer of 1942, while the Soviets scrambled to carve usable airfields
out of the Siberian wilderness, the newly established Army Air Force Air Transport Command
(ATC) faced the task of preparing the hastily constructed airfields of the Northwest route for the
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huge volume of traffic that the Lend-Lease shipments would necessitate.25 The ATC’s Ferrying
Division had immediate responsibility for the airfields and “on June 26, Col. William Tunner of
the ATC's Ferrying Division gave Lt. Col. Leroy P. de Arce, commander of the 7th Ferrying
Group, his mission: ‘You will take necessary action to organize and operate a ferrying route
between Great Falls, Montana and Fairbanks, Alaska, through Lethbridge, Calgary, Edmonton,
Fort St. John, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake and Whitehorse, Canada and through Northway and Big
Delta, Alaska.’”26
Big Delta would prove to be the last stop on the Northwest route before the planes
reached the rendezvous with their new Soviet pilots at Ladd Field in Fairbanks. The May 1942
Japanese invasion of the Aleutians had ensured that the Big Delta Airfield was far from ready for
its new, critical role in supporting the operation to aid the Soviet Union, but construction was
soon under way for a new, 7,000 foot long runway to complement the two that had been built by
the CAA the previous year.27 June and July of 1942 brought the first garrison of troops to the
airfield, with “a platoon of Company, E, 138th Infantry and Company C, 176th Engineers” taking
up residence under the command of a Captain Anderson.28
Though the airfield at Big Delta and other facilities in Alaska remained part of the Alaska
Defense Command under the control of the Eleventh Air Force, in mid-August the 7th Ferrying
Group commander Lt. Col. de Arce gave responsibility for the Big Delta Airfield and all other
bases in the Alaskan sector of the Northwest route to the 384th Air Base Squadron under the
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command of Maj. F. Kitchigman.29 A detachment from the 384th was sent to augment the
garrison at the airfield and ensure that it was ready for the flow of aircraft that was anticipated.
Almost as soon as the preparations had been made, however, word came from Washington that
seemed to halt the entire project.
The first group of Lend-Lease aircraft, five A-20 light bombers, arrived at Ladd Field on
September 3, having made the 1,900 mile trip from Great Falls, Montana in two days.30 Nine
more A-20s, thirty P-40 fighters, and six C-47 transports soon followed. Soviet crews arrived in
Alaska to organize the transfers, and all seemed to be going smoothly when, on September 19,
General Alexander Belyaev, head of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington,
announced that the Soviet government had come to the decision that the ALSIB route was not
suitable.31 This startling reversal caused intense frustration in the American military
administration, and the War Department halted all aircraft shipments to Alaska. For two weeks,
uncertainty ruled, and the future of the Big Delta Airfield and the rest of the Northwest route no
longer seemed assured.32
When, on September 21, the War Department notified its representative in ALSIB
negotiations in Moscow, Army Air Force Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, that the ALSIB route would
no longer be an option for Lend-Lease delivery, Bradley brought the issue to the Soviet’s
attention, and was surprised to find that Moscow had no knowledge of Belyaev’s assertion.33
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Bradley received word on October 4 that the Soviet “government had decided to keep the ALSIB
air route open.”34 The miscommunications continued, and on October 6, the “disgusted War
Department” notified Bradley “that it now considered the ALSIB air route definitely and finally
closed. When General Bradley passed this information on to his Soviet colleagues, the news
produced a violent commotion.”35 Bradley, at their request, asked the War Department to
reassess that determination, notifying them that the Soviets were still in favor of the route, and
wanted to operate ALSIB at full throttle.36 Given the amount of planning and preparation that
had already gone into the buildup of the Northwest route, the War Department relented, and
Soviet pilots began preparations to ferry the planes that had already reached Alaska before the
two week halt in the process.37
For the Soviets that would remain in Fairbanks on a long-term basis, the language barrier
and a lack of interpreters prevented any significant interactions with American personnel. Also
contributing to their isolation were orders prohibiting fraternization, orders enforced by a fear of
NKVD surveillance and punishment for perceived infractions.38 An incident in mid-July 1943, in
which two NKVD officers were involved in the disappearance of an American driver, inflamed
tensions between Soviets and Americans, but when the driver’s body was found with no signs of
foul play, suspicions eased, and a more normal relationship resumed.39 The most notable area of
cultural exchange was in the stores of Fairbanks, where both pilots and long-term staff took
advantage of the wide variety of goods available to purchase luxury items for relatives and
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friends in Russia. Many of the aircraft that departed Alaska carried packages intended for loved
ones as well as military equipment.40
Once aircraft delivery had finally begun, new problems emerged to make meeting the
proposed volume of 142 planes per month impossible.41 Given the late in the year starting date,
winter weather conditions soon arrived to make things more difficult. The lengthy flight from
Montana ensured that by the time planes reached Big Delta they would often need maintenance.
Many of the airfields on the Northwest route had no hangar to allow mechanics to work indoors,
thus forcing the technicians to do their work in the full onslaught of the elements, working in
relays so that no man spent too long in the cold. In 1942, the construction of a large Birchwoodtype hangar “immediately adjacent to the newly built airfield as an auxiliary rest and refueling
stop for American pilots ferrying Lend-Lease aircraft to Fairbanks” added to the facilities of the
airfield.42 Despite the construction, the mechanics had insufficient training and supplies for the
work they were expected to perform. 43
These, and other issues help explain why, although the straight flying time over the
Northwest route was only nine to fourteen hours, the average length of transit for a plane from
Great Falls to Fairbanks was 25.3 days.44 Especially in the winter, when daylight would last for
only a few hours and bad weather could keep planes grounded for days, pilots would be forced to
land at each base along the route, emphasizing the necessity of airfields such as the one at Big
Delta to facilitate year round aid to the Soviet Union.45 The unusually severe winter weather that
arrived in November 1942 exacerbated the existing structural problems with the Northwest route,
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and combined with the confusion caused by the last-minute Soviet vacillation, kept the
Americans from meeting the promised volume of aid during the waning months of the year.46
Only 148 aircraft were delivered to the Soviets in the last four months of 1942, a far cry
from the promised 142 planes per month. As time progressed, however, the system became more
efficient, and the Americans exceeded their goal by April 1943.47 By the end of the war, the
Soviet Union received 7,925 planes via ALSIB, including 2,397 P-63 Kingcobra fighters, 2,618
P-39 Aircobra fighters, 1363 A-20 light bombers, and 710 C-47 Skytrain cargo planes.48
Deliveries via this route accounted for nearly half of the 14,798 total planes, worth over $1.1
billion delivered to the Soviets over the course of the war through the Lend-Lease program.49
Though the Soviets would not allow American military observers to join their forces or
inform Americans of how and where they were using Lend-Lease materials, making it difficult
to understand the role American aid played in the overall Soviet war effort, Stalin himself
acknowledged the importance of American aircraft to Soviet forces. The Soviet leader admitted
to Roosevelt that the “arrival of airplanes, without fliers (we have enough fliers of our own) at
the Southwestern or Central front would play an enormous role on the most important sectors of
struggle against Hitler.”50 The near parity of German and Soviet aircraft production meant that
even small numbers of American planes could be decisive. A few reports on the use of American
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planes did reach the West, and both German and American observers believed that the American
aid did play a material role in allowing the Soviets to achieve at least numerical air superiority.51
With the end of the war, however, the entire Lend-Lease program to the Soviet Union
abruptly ended. On September 2, V-J Day, Washington ordered the suspension of all Lend-Lease
deliveries around the world. For the ALSIB route, this meant that at least twenty C-47s that had
reached Fairbanks for delivery were grounded, and eventually transferred to the possession of the
Alaskan Department.52 By October 9, the last Soviet personnel departed Alaska, and the once
critical bases of the Northwest route lost their raison d’être.53
Even before the last planes made their way north to Fairbanks, the inevitable end of
hostilities initiated a drawdown of forces in Alaska, and in August 1945, the Big Delta Airfield,
which, during a reorganization of the Alaska Wing (AW), Air Transport Command in September
1943, had been designated Section 17 AW ATC, was closed.54 The airfield was returned to the
care of the CAA to be operated as a commercial airfield with only a skeleton army crew left to
maintain the facility.55
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Chapter 2- Fighting a Cold War in Cold Weather
Though the end of World War II seemed to spell the end of any significant military
presence in Big Delta, the tensions of the Cold War ensured that that would not be the case. The
military importance of Alaska during the war had placed the formerly forgotten territory firmly
within the national defense mindset, and led to levels of public awareness unprecedented even in
the boom years of the Gold Rush.1 Most of this attention focused on Alaska’s position astride the
Great Circle air route, and military strategists warned of the vulnerability of the Lower FortyEight should an enemy (who in the calculations of planners would presumably be the Soviet
Union) make inroads into the territory and take over isolated airfields for the use of their own
bombers.2
Top military officials in the interlude between World War II and the conflict in Korea
worried that inadequate garrisons at the newly constructed airfields in Alaska could easily be
overrun by a surprise attack and the resulting entrenched enemies would be “extremely difficult
to dislodge.”3 Politicians in Congress also voiced concerns over Alaska’s vulnerability, with a
representative from California stating, “Soviet Russia is looking at Alaska with covetous eyes.”4
Lending credence to this assertion was a 1948 article in Foreign Affairs that highlighted the
apparent commitment within the Soviet Union to arctic development, and the evidence of a
Soviet commitment to a “polar strategy” that would necessarily threaten Alaska.5
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Concurrent with the fear of Soviet inroads into Alaska was the awareness that U.S.
readiness to wage war in extreme cold was woefully inadequate. This weakness had been
exposed during the campaign to retake the Aleutian island of Attu from Japanese forces in 1942.
During the three weeks of fighting on the island, more soldiers became casualties due to the
severe cold than were wounded by enemy fire: 1,200 injuries due to cold compared to 1,148
wounded by the Japanese.6 Though the impact of the cold on this campaign caused changes in
military equipment during the war, American officials recognized the necessity of winter training
for individual soldiers as well. On Attu, prolonged exposure to severe cold caused men to shut
down mentally and physically and be unresponsive when called into action.7 Following the war,
the Army sought answers from captured German officers regarding the requirements for
successful winter campaigns, especially against the proven winter-ready forces of the Soviet
Union.8
Thus, even before the Soviet Union proved its ability to threaten the entire globe with its
nuclear capabilities, its massive conventional forces, and especially the build-up of such forces in
Siberia, proved sufficient to spur a reversal of the cutbacks that had immediately followed the
war’s end.9 To prevent some of the inter-service squabbles and miscommunications that had
plagued the wartime operations in Alaska, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Alaskan
Command (ALCOM) on January 1, 1947, the first unified command created by the Joint
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Chiefs.10 From that point onward, the Alaskan Air Command (AAC), U.S. Army Alaska
(USARAL), and the Alaskan Sea Frontier (ALSEAFRON) would all be directly under the
control of Headquarters ALCOM, with Lieutenant General Howard A. Craig, who reported
directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in command.11
Almost concurrently with the creation of the ALCOM came the National Security Act,
which, along with establishing the position of the Secretary of Defense, formally separated the
Air Force as a separate branch of the armed forces of the United States.12 These organizational
shake-ups created logistical headaches for the Alaskan military installations affected,
necessitating some transfers of responsibility. Accordingly, several Joint Army-Air Force
Adjustment Regulations were issued, the second of which transferred the airfield at Big Delta to
the control of the newly created Air Force.13 The seemingly insignificant base, which had been in
caretaker status since the summer of 1945, was soon to take center stage in the first post-war cold
weather maneuver.14
In March 1947, ALCOM began to make plans for an exercise, “the first of its kind in
Alaska,” to be held the following winter of 1947-48.15 Dubbed Exercise Yukon, the Defense
Department chose the Big Delta Airfield for the maneuvers.16 In October, news of the maneuver
was made public, with the commander of the army ground forces Gen. Jacob L. Devers making a
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statement about the planned exercise, and noting the importance of Alaska’s defense.17 Exercise
Yukon’s stated purpose, according to the Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, was:
To develop air transportability methods for the Arctic.
To develop methods of training and indoctrination of ground force units for Arctic
operations.
To carry out a series of maneuvers in Alaska involving air transportability and
defense of airfields.
To make observations and records of all operations in order to furnish a basis for
the development of doctrines, tactics, techniques, and organization for future Arctic
operations.18
Underlying the thought process behind the exercise was the continued threat of armed
takeover of Alaskan or other northern outposts; it was no accident that the units chosen for the
training were taken from the 2nd Division stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington, as these were the
closest troops who would be called upon “in the event of a true emergency.”19 The initial idea
was that the entire 2nd Division would take part in the exercise, but ALCOM was forced to
inform Washington that it “couldn’t begin to support such a force for a few days, much less for
the winter,” and the Air Force did not have the troop transport capacity to move that many men
to Alaska in the first place.20 Subsequent discussions proposed a “regimental combat exercise
team,” and then a battalion, before finally settling on one company at a time, the largest force
that the military infrastructure in Alaska could support.21
The exercise would be spread out over four months, November 1947 through February
1948, with each month seeing a different company participate in a unique scenario. The four
groups were “augmented rifle companies of 250 officers and enlisted men each…Each company

17

“Army to Train GI’s in Alaska During Winter,” Chicago Tribune, October 7, 1947, 5.
Moore, “An Observer with Exercise Yukon,” 12.
19
Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3, 55.
20
John G. Norris, “U.S. Army Presents Curious Parallel to 1941 Conditions,” The Washington
Post, May 18, 1947, sec. M.
21
Ibid.
18

19

was to consist of an infantry rifle company of 6 officers and 150 enlisted men, plus such
additional elements that all combat units of an infantry division would be represented by at least
a platoon in one of the four companies. Each company was to be commanded by a field
officer.”22 The companies were designated Ucon A, to arrive in November, Ucon B for
December, Ucon C in January, and Ucon D in February.23
Even before they arrived in Alaska, the men of the 2nd Division received three phases of
training to prepare for the exercise. First, since air transportability was a major component of the
exercise objective, three officers and twelve enlisted men chosen from among the troops slated
for the exercise received training in “history of air movement; basic loading theory to include
knots and lashings, computation of weights and balances, and actual demonstrations of loading;
air movement doctrines, tactics, theory, and techniques; and classroom air movement exercises”
from members of the 82nd Airborne.24 Once this vanguard had received their training, they
passed on their newly acquired knowledge to the rest of the participants, and all the troops soon
participated in training flights, with an emphasis on the organized loading and unloading of the
aircraft with both men and equipment, and on the part of the loading officers, “flexibility of
plans…to insure quick adaptability to the actual conditions at the time of emplaning. It was
stressed that in the event the planned number of planes was not available, each commander must
know exactly what equipment he intended to leave behind.”25 The training even included a
simulated defense of a Washington airfield from an “enemy” airborne unit to further test the new
skills of the groups.26
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After the soldiers had shown their proficiency with the use of air transport, they received
some “Pre-Arctic school” training, focusing on the “repair of skis and snowshoes; winterization
of ordnance, signal and engineer equipment; and care and use of Arctic clothing and
equipment.”27 Finally, the troops went through a period of acclimatization training on the slopes
of Mt. Rainier, Washington intended to somewhat prepare them for the conditions they would
encounter in Alaska. They focused on the practical aspects of surviving in a frigid environment,
including “Arctic cooking; snow melting… fire building and fire prevention…frost
bite…construction of Arctic shelters; ski instruction…[and the] buddy system.”28 While there,
the troops split into five-man teams and learned to survive together in a tent. Each company
spent three weeks on their acclimatization training prior to departure for Alaska, and received
valuable preparation for the exercise to come.29
Dr. Paul Siple, an Arctic explorer and expert, explained the purpose of this extensive
training in somewhat clearer terms before the first company departed for Alaska:
The cold is unusual, but you can defeat it…The objective of Exercise Yukon is to
determine whether, after adequate training, a group of men can drop into an area by air,
be self-sufficient, and still have time left to actually fight or carry out a mission. That is
the one big question we are trying to answer. This exercise will be a success if, on the
final five day maneuver, you can land on one of the outlying airfields, establish
yourselves, take care of yourselves, and have time left to carry out a specific assigned
mission. We have every reason to believe it can be done, but it hasn’t been proved
militarily.30
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The route the troops traveled to reach Alaska mimiced the ALSIB route of World War II. Little
had changed in the two years since the war’s end, and the rough route of the Alcan Highway was
the only indication of civilization for most of the journey.31

Figure 1- Route to Alaska32

Like clockwork, every month from November to February, Fairchild C-82 transports arrived,
bringing the next company to Big Delta Airfield, which would serve as a staging area.33
Upon arrival at Big Delta, each company was issued some specialized equipment,
including tents, stoves, skis, snowshoes, and toboggans, and went through further preliminary
training exercises. For Ucon B, which departed McChord Field, Washington on November 30
and spent six days in transit to arrive in Alaska on December 5, this training took the form of a
three-day “shakedown exercise” in the area of Big Delta to ensure that no unforeseen
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complications resulting from the trip or the northern climate would appear once the main event
was underway.34
On December 6, while the troops were still familiarizing themselves with the Alaskan
terrain, a set of General and Specific Situations were issued:
General Situation
Late in November, Commander in Chief, Alaska [CINCAL], received the following
message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Current intelligence indicates that an attack on the United States is
imminent. Enemy is capable of delivering limited air and airborne attacks
on airfields in your theater. Second Infantry Division and “X” troop carrier
squadron are immediately available to you. You will be advised as to
further availability of forces to implement your plans. Acknowledge.
CINCAL ordered that a reinforced rifle company, 2d Infantry Division, be air-transported
to Big Delta immediately for an urgent and specific task to be assigned upon arrival in the
theater.
Special Situation
Ucon Company B, reinforced, from the 2d Infantry Division, has arrived at Big Delta,
Alaska. The 7th Troop Carrier Squadron, consisting of fifteen (15) C-82 aircraft, has
arrived at Elmendorf Field for the purpose of transporting Ucon Company B any place
that it may be ordered. Both units have been placed under the Commanding General,
Alaskan Air Command, who has delegated operational control to the Commanding
General, Yukon Sector. The Commanding General, Yukon Sector, has ordered Ucon
Company B and the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron to be ready to move to any point in
Alaska, combat loaded, upon twenty-four (24) hours notice.35
That notice came on December 11 in the form of a message from the Commanding General,
Yukon Sector. The “mission” assigned to Ucon Company B was revealed:
Aggressor forces have captured U.S. Airdrome at Nome, Alaska. Aggressor
reconnaissance aviation has been active over McGrath. Ucon Company B will move by
air to McGrath, 12 December 47. Seventh Troop Carrier Squadron will provide fifteen
(15) C-82 Type Aircraft for the move. Fifty-seventh Fighter Squadron will provide air
cover, escort, and interception for movement. Commanding officer Big Delta Air Base
will provide protection during loading phase. End.36
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Once these orders were received, Ucon Company B officers created a plan for the defense of the
McGrath airfield and began preparing for the move to the more remote location.

Figure 2- Plan of 'Battle' for Exercise Yukon37

Immediately upon arrival to McGrath, having been protected from “Aggressor” fighters
on the journey, Ucon B found their movements hampered by snow depths officially reported as
twenty-two inches, though some areas boasted much deeper snow.38 As an observer of the
exercise noted, “Despite the use of snowshoes, skis and toboggans, it proved to be a man-sized
job merely to transport equipment from the aircraft on the runway to the bivouac areas a few
hundred yards distant. It was evident that the movement of troops from their bivouac area to any
threatened sector would be a slow and laborious process.”39 The defenders recognized, however,
that the same difficulties would hamper the movements of the “aggressors” as well. Additionally,
37

Ibid.
Ibid., 17.
39
Ibid.
38

24

Ucon B found that the M-29 C “Weasel” tracked vehicles proved very useful in packing down
paths through the snow, giving defenders an advantage.40
After Company B arrived, attacks from small “Aggressor” forces, led by several officers
who were previously members of the Alaska Scouts, and therefore were very well-versed in
snow mobility, tested them.41 The same pilots from the 57th Fighter Group who had “protected”
Company B on its journey to McGrath carried out simulated air attacks on December 14th, which
were followed by a simulated airdrop and ground attack by aggressor forces, against which
Company B held its ground, “though results of the air attack were not taken strictly into
account.”42 On the 15th and 16th, the roles were reversed, and members of Ucon B trekked to a
simulated drop zone east of the airfield to try their hand at dislodging aggressor forces from their
supposed toehold on a “captured” airbase.43 These exercises clearly aimed at preparing for the
type of attack that many in Washington feared was likely to come from the Soviets, involving the
remote airfields of Alaska.
By December 18, Company B’s portion of the exercise was finished, and the C-82s
arrived to return the troops to Big Delta to complete their thirty-day stay in Alaska.44 Ucon B’s
successful “defense” of, and “attack” on, McGrath airfield in December was preceded by Ucon
A’s similar exercise at Galena in November and followed by Ucon C’s maneuvers in January,
which also took place at Galena, and Ucon D’s excursion to Nome in February.45 Each company
spent five days at its isolated target, with the remainder of their time in Alaska spent at Big
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Delta.46 The only major problems discovered involved logistics: a shipping strike that lasted
through December 1947 affected the transport of supplies to Alaska, and weather-related delays
to C-82 flights, including a period in December of installation of de-icing equipment meant that
troops could have been transported more quickly by sea.47 These issues did not prevent the
exercise from being a success, however, and when the final group completed its stay in early
March 1948, the exercise had not only supplied invaluable experience to the troops involved, it
had also highlighted the value of the post at Big Delta for cold weather training purposes.
In assessing the lessons learned from Yukon, observer Lt. Col. R. E. Moore emphasized
the importance that prior training in Arctic survival and tactics had played in allowing the troops
to effectively operate in the field. Despite the fact that during his period of observation
temperatures only fell to -15 F°, dealing with the cold seriously affected every aspect of
operations, making even simple tasks such as cooking a meal much more complex and timeconsuming. Bulky cold weather clothing hampered movement, and the danger of overheating
due to exertion in the cold was always present.48 If a fighting force were to be needed in the
Arctic, it would be critical that those being transported to the front were already apprised of the
basics of cold-weather survival and could focus on the enemy.
Only two months after the close of Exercise Yukon, preparations began for the
establishment of a permanent training facility at Big Delta. On May 1, 1948, the post was
officially transferred away from the Air Force to the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army,
and the post was named “U.S. Troops, Big Delta, Alaska.”49 Command went to Major Joseph
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Venezia, and in November of that year, the Army Arctic Indoctrination School was established at
the post.50 The Arctic Indoctrination School grew out of the same fear of a northern invasion
route as most of the rest of the post-war military build-up in Alaska. As Exercise Yukon
illustrated, preparation was key to Arctic warfare, and the perception that the Soviets were
infinitely better prepared to fight in the cold was, as earlier noted, a common trend in military
thinking immediately post-World War II.51 Central to the establishment of the Arctic
Indoctrination School was the idea that “the destiny of the United States may some day be at
stake in the whistling winds and frigid air of our northern outpost.”52
It was to “insure that the United States Army would be prepared to carry out its share in
safeguarding ‘the destiny of the United States’ in the Arctic [that] an indoctrination program to
familiarize officers and enlisted personnel with Arctic problems and techniques was instituted.”
At the very beginning, the staff of instructors and operating units consisted of approximately 140
officers and men, consisting largely of volunteers from the 23rd Infantry Regiment.53 The winter
of 1948-49 saw the first classes conducted at the Indoctrination School under commandant Lt.
Col. Walter Al Downing, with two four-week courses bringing Arctic training to 75 officers and
enlisted men from the Lower 48, including several Navy and Air Force personnel, and 25
selected men from ALCOM forces.54 The post also hosted “several test groups of the technical
services test[ing] clothing and other equipment” during that winter, including “Operation

50

Ibid.; “History of Big ‘D.’”
Vaughn, “Cold Memories,” 25-26.
52
Army Armed Forces Talk, “Alaska--Our Northern Outpost,” quoted in Lt. Col. James L.
Collins, Jr., “The Army Arctic Indoctrination School,” Military Review 29, no. 5 (August, 1949): 28.
53
“History of Big ‘D.’”
54
Collins, Jr., “The Army Arctic Indoctrination School,” 29; and Woodman, Duty Station
Northwest, Vol. 3, 83.
51

27

Greaseball,” which involved “nearly three months testing new lubricants and automotive items in
the extreme cold.”55
On July 1, 1949, U.S. Troops, Big Delta, Alaska was renamed the Army Arctic Training
Center (AATC) to more appropriately reflect the various activities underway at the base.56 The
various units stationed at the base were also reorganized at this time into three distinct groups.
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Figure 3- Photo of Army Arctic Training Center Headquarters, circa 195057

The Headquarters and the Headquarters Company of the Army Arctic Training Center were
given their own mission statement separate from that of the Indoctrination School:
1. Normal station operation and maintenance, including auxiliary landing field
2. Station level support for the AAIS, ATB (AFF), and any other organization may be
temporarily or permanently assigned.
3. Defend Big Delta AFB.
4. Provide a mobile force for use in defense of other areas of the theatre.58
Though the original wartime construction at the base was spartan, the AATC did its best to
provide those stationed in Big Delta some of the normal services of a military base.59 The small
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base vastly expanded its services during the waning months of 1948 until it could offer a Service
Club, Chapel, Commissary, Dispensary, and Post Exchange.60
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Figure 4- Clockwise from bottom left- Chapel, Commissary, Post Exchange, Dispensary circa 195061

The Army Arctic Indoctrination School itself occupied “a cluster of Quonset huts and
Jamesway shelters located about a mile from the main post and landing strip.” It was from here
that it would seek to fulfill its official mission, which stated:
The Army Arctic Indoctrination School is to provide instruction in summer and winter
military operation under arctic and sub-arctic conditions, to include arctic survival,
mountaineering, and tactical, technical, and logistical problems. To provide officers of
the ground arms and services with a sound basic knowledge of arctic conditions to
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include terrain and weather, survival, movement, logistics, and minor field operations,
and thereby make available a reservoir of leaders and instructors in arctic operations.62
Key to the choice of Big Delta for the school was the wide variety of terrains to be found in the
immediate vicinity of the base: “mountains, plains, forests, muskeg, tundra, glaciers, rivers,
lakes, and swamps. Snow cover is also typical, varying from none on clear, wind-swept flats to
from three to eight feet in the heavily-timbered and mountainous areas.”63
By August 1949 staffing for the school included five officers who were “veterans of
extensive arctic experience and [had] themselves encountered most of the situations that a soldier
might find in the far North.”64 The instruction at the school encompassed both physical and
psychological preparation for the cold. Psychological training focused on counteracting the
possible demoralizing effect of a fear of the cold. By exposing students to extended periods of
cold, and exhibiting the survivability of even extreme temperatures with minimal equipment, the
school taught by example.65
Concurrently, physical training focused on survival and transportation. Personal
transportation methods in the curriculum included the use of skis and snowshoes, with an
emphasis on the fitness and skill required to successfully transport necessary equipment via those
methods.66 Survival skills taught included “the preparation of individual rations, the building of
lean-tos and snow caves, and the proper use of cold weather clothing and equipment.”67 In
addition to these main areas, the school also provided instruction in “Hunting and Fishing in the
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Arctic, First Aid and Sanitation, Over-Snow Vehicle Operation, Over-Snow Freighting, Land
Navigation, Geography of Alaska, Terrain and Weather, and Tactical Operations in the Arctic.”68
All these skills were taught by experience, with ninety percent of time in the course spent in the
field, despite any adverse weather conditions, in accordance with the school motto: “There is no
substitute for experience.”69
Obviously, the original motivation behind the establishment of the Arctic Indoctrination
School was the need for Army training in extreme cold temperatures. The northern regions,
however, can be even more difficult to operate in during the summer months. Assuming a
conflict was to arise that involved ground troops in a northern terrain, the eventual thaw of the
winter snow and ice would bring myriad new problems (quite literally, since the vast amounts of
standing water left after the spring melt lead to untold billions of mosquitoes). In recognition of
this, in the spring of 1950, the Indoctrination School received direction to test a new summer
regimen of study.70
Following successful tests in the summers of 1950-51, the Indoctrination School
instituted summer courses that sought to counteract the single greatest difficulty troops would
face in an Arctic summer: mobility, or a lack thereof. In the area around Big Delta were to be
found, as earlier noted, different types of terrain representative of nearly all to be encountered in
the Arctic, so troops were able to tackle mountains, highlands, and lowlands, and all the vagaries
of transport those regions could provide.71 The summer courses provided training in crosscountry foot and tracked vehicle travel atop highly unstable muskeg and tundra, rock and glacier
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climbing, and the operation of small boats on inland waterways for the transport of men and
supplies.72

Blocked for
Copyright Purposes

Figure 5- Clockwise from bottom left- Winter Hexagonal Tent, Winter Skijoring Instruction, Summer Glacier Climbing,
Summer Boat Course73

The final part of the reorganization of the Big Delta Post added a new unit in mid-July of
1949 with the arrival of the main body of the Arctic Test Branch of the Army Field Forces.74The
test branch was tasked with the following mission: “The Arctic Test Branch will conduct service
tests of Army Field Forces Equipment under Arctic and Sub-arctic terrain conditions. It will
recommend military characteristics for special Arctic equipment to use in the Arctic and develop
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data on the effects of Arctic and Sub-arctic environment on personnel and Army Field Forces
Equipment.” 75 The Arctic Test Branch served as a replacement for the temporary task forces and
detachments that had conducted small and large scale testing from 1946 to 1949. Operations like
Task Force Frigid, a testing program involving nearly 1,600 men assigned to Ladd Field in
Fairbanks in 1946, provided valuable information for the test boards, but the temporary nature of
the task force prevented comprehensive testing in all possible weather conditions.76 Task Force
Williwaw on Adak Island, and Task Force Frost at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, as well as various
other smaller scale test detachments suffered from the same limitations, and made the need for a
permanent establishment clear.77
Organizationally, the Arctic Test Branch was a supplement to the other test boards
established after the war to streamline the piecemeal system of materiel testing that the
exigencies of wartime had shown to be insufficient for the requirements of the service.78 The ten
test boards, each focused on a different arm or service, that had directed wartime testing were
consolidated into three ground force boards in 1945, with a fourth board added in 1946.
Together, these boards had the responsibility of “evaluating recommendations for development,
preparation of military characteristics, and performance of user test for equipment of the field
army.”79
The US Army Airborne, Electronics, and Special Warfare Board at Fort Bragg, NC, the
Air Defense Board at Fort Bliss, TX, the US Army Armor and Engineer Board at Fort Knox,
KY, and the Infantry Board at Fort Benning, GA all had representative branches at the Arctic
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Test Branch, with the Alaskan branch reporting to the parent board on equipment under its
jurisdiction.80 To bring cohesion to the different branches with the Branch and make it into a
viable unit, a Headquarters, a Maintenance Section, a Supply Section, and a Headquarters
Detachment were established.81
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Figure 6- Headquarters, Arctic Test Branch, circa 195082

Though the Test Branch consisted of twenty-nine officers, two warrant officers, 256 enlisted
men, and eleven civilian employees, it still required support from the main post for base level
support.83 Decisions on testing were made at the Army Field Forces level and filtered through the
parent test boards in the Lower 48, with the Arctic Test Branch receiving orders on “the plan of
test and the method and conditions under which the test is to be made” from the parent board.
Once completed, reports on the test made their way in a reverse order back to the Army Field
Forces.84
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A wide variety of items underwent testing at the Branch, including various types of
clothing, footwear, vehicles, boats, aircraft, and every other conceivable piece of military
equipment. 85 The work of the Arctic Test Branch, along with the training conducted at the
Arctic Indoctrination School, provided valuable support to the overall cold weather fighting
abilities of the United States Army. From near oblivion in 1945, the post at Big Delta found itself
hosting activities that fulfilled a vital role in the Army mission.
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Figure 7- Clockwise from bottom left- Heavy Cargo Sled Test, Oversnow Vehicle Test, Cold Weather Clothing Test, Test
of Howitzer in Deep Snow86
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The 1950s found both testing and training firmly in place, and a period of intense
construction provided the expanding base with many new structures. A World War II-era mess
hall was rebuilt in 1950 after a fire, and 1954 and 1955 saw the completion of a new post
exchange, family housing, barracks, gymnasium, fire station, commissary, gas station, power
plant, and various other base infrastructure.87 The culmination of this frenzy of construction
came on July 1, 1955, when the post was officially renamed Fort Greely in honor of Maj. Gen.
Adolphus W. Greely, a famed arctic explorer and pioneer of communication.88 The new fort was
the second permanent post-war fort in Alaska, following Fort Richardson near Anchorage, and
its creation and continued existence largely were owed to the heightening tensions of the Cold
War and the fear of the Soviet Union.
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Chapter 3 - Testing and Training at Fort Greely
On June 21, 1955, Army General Orders (GO) Number 40 officially withdrew the name
“Greely” from the World War II-era site on Kodiak Island, Alaska and assigned it to the
installation at Big Delta that had been formally designated as a permanent installation on August
16, 1954 with GO 60.1 Despite the name change, the mission of the troops stationed at the post
remained essentially the same. The location of the newly renamed fort made it uniquely
important for an army engaged in a Cold War for two reasons: first, the cold climate and varied
terrain of interior Alaska provided unparalleled opportunities for testing equipment and training
soldiers in cold weather, and second, the relatively remote location allowed for a wide range of
training and testing activities, including live-fire exercises.
The Arctic Indoctrination School continued its mission as an installation at Fort Greely,
serving as one of two training sites for cold weather and mountain operations along with Camp
Carson, CO.2 In 1957, however, the Army decided to reduce the overlap, and the Mountain
Training Center in Colorado was closed, with “all responsibility for cold weather and mountain
training” going to the Indoctrination School.3 To better reflect its widened scope of instruction, it
was renamed the Army Cold Weather and Mountain School.4 The removal of the word “Arctic”
from the name was part of an intentional shift in terminology throughout the Alaskan command,
one designed to remove the “mysterious menace” conveyed by terms such as “Arctic” and “subzero.” The training at the fort sought to combat “a psychological attitude in the men it trains,
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which it terms the Fort Greeley [sic] shakes.”5 By early 1959, the post, under the command of
Col. Richard D. Middlebrooks, who also commanded the Cold Weather and Mountain School,
had a permanent garrison of 930 officers and men, with students on temporary assignment
generally augmenting that number.6 The school taught at least seven regular courses a year, with
each course containing about 120 students.7
In fulfilling the “Cold Weather” portion of its mission, the school put special emphasis on
“developing individuals qualified to perform as instructors,” since cold weather knowledge was
still recognized to be lacking, and ignorance of proper cold-weather techniques was considered a
serious flaw in the Army’s ability to conduct cold-weather operations.8 This did not essentially
alter the courses offered, as students for the “four-week cold weather and ski instructors course”
or the “ten-day winter orientation course” still learned basic cold weather survival and
operational skills, and participated in winter mobility and combat training. Underlying it all was
one critical understanding: “the Russians fight at 30 below; we must learn to do the same.”9
Even in Alaska’s interior, however, below-zero temperatures do not endure year round.
During the brief summers, the “Mountain” portion of the school’s name gained added
significance. In 1961, a video camera followed the six-week summer training course to record
their activities for the Army’s The Big Picture television series, providing a fascinating look at
the activities undertaken by students. According to the video’s narration, the 120 men about to
embark on the course would “develop skills not only for survival in the rugged high ranges, but
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also for the accomplishment of military missions under the difficult conditions imposed by
vertical terrain.”10
Upon arrival at Fort Greely, students received the equipment and clothing that would be
necessary for the course. The first order of business, however, was in the classroom, where
students learned about the areas that would be necessary for the coming weeks: map reading,
geography, weather observation, and maintenance of supplies. Only after completion of the
classroom instruction did students move outside, first learning to rig shelter in the form of a
standard ten-man tent or improvised brush and branch lean-tos. Instructors required these
preliminaries before students left the relative civilization of the main post of Fort Greely to truly
begin their training.11
That training would largely take place at the Black Rapids Training Site, a “satellite
instruction facility” thirty-seven miles south of the main post established in 1954 to take
advantage of the year-round snow to be found on the higher elevations of the Alaska Range.12
Black Rapids featured housing for the students, classrooms for any further required indoor
training, and recreational facilities for the off hours. Those were few and far between, however,
given the intensity of the six-week training program. At nearby Falls Creek, students began basic
mountain movement instruction; first simply hiking on the mountain trails, and then gradually
moving to steeper and more treacherous terrain. Instructors introduced the men to techniques
such as glissading, an elegant term for a decidedly non-elegant method of descent- essentially a
semi-controlled slide down a steep slope. The true aim of these exercises was to instill a sense of
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the value of teamwork in the students, as that quality would become more and more critical as
they encountered more rugged obstacles.13
Before those obstacles could be faced, however, another skill was required: ropehandling. Nearly a week of instruction went into teaching the students the knots necessary for
mountaineering. Once those were mastered, students began to learn the basics of rock climbing
on the ninety-foot cliffs at Falls Creek, with an emphasis on the proper foot and hand holds.
From the tops of the cliffs, students practiced body rappelling using a parachute without the
canopy for its 120 feet of nylon line. They also learned to construct a vertical hauling line, which
was a simple device consisting of two tree trunks lashed together to form an inverted V-shape. It
was secured with a system of ropes to the top of a the cliff, with a knotted rope for aiding a
climber suspended from it. It allowed a man to reach the top in a matter of a few seconds with
only minimal effort. Even less effort was required for the suspension traverse; essentially a zipline used for “swift descent or movement from one peak to another.”14
Cliffs were not the only obstacles that students learned to overcome. Instructors taught
them to construct and use rope bridges across streams. The two-line model, consisting only of
two ropes suspended vertically atop one another across a stream, required practice and skill for
successful use. Students also learned to construct a three-rope bridge, which required more time
to put together, but was more suitable for men wearing full field packs. To finish up the
instruction at Falls Creek, students were instructed in techniques for medical evacuation,
including securing a ‘wounded’ man to a litter and lowering him safely down the face of a cliff
under the guidance of two rappelling comrades.15
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Once the class had mastered the basics of mountaineering at Falls Creek, instruction
moved to nearby Whistler’s Creek to take advantage of 120-foot cliffs and ice shelves. Students
learned to ascend the nearly sheer ice faces in teams of three and practiced rapidly rappelling
down the rock faces, making the 120-foot descent in only three jumps. Training then moved to
the Gulkana Glacier, allowing students to learn safe techniques for traveling across glaciers,
since glaciers form “excellent lines of communication and transportation through mountains.”
Students moved across the ice in roped-together formations, with the lead man carefully feeling
his way, using an ice ax to probe the snow cover to check for hidden crevices or caverns.16
The school supplemented training in the mountains with instruction on river operations
on the Tanana River, approximately fifteen miles north of Fort Greely. Upon completion of
classroom instruction on motor maintenance and operation, boating equipment, and river study,
students set out on thirty-foot spruce plank boats to gain experience in reading the river so as to
avoid hidden obstacles or shoals, properly beach the boat upon landing, and deal with a man
overboard. An intense test of these skills came from one of the final portions of the class, the
field exercise.17
Student instructions were to “move fifty miles up the Tanana River, establish a
beachhead, destroy an intermediate objective, and continue overland to [the] final objective.”
Instructors divided the class into the components of a tactical unit, with one student appointed
commander. Under the watchful eye of instructors, students began what would be twelve hours
of travel upriver, finally reaching the point at which a beachhead could be established. Once
ashore, instructors gave the ‘commander’ orders for the next move, mimicking a true combat
situation where routes and objectives would only be announced as the move was made. Students
16
17
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were to travel several miles up a gravel riverbed to a timed rendezvous with helicopters. If they
missed the rendezvous, they would have to move forty miles on foot to reach the final objective,
a trip that would take two days. In the helicopters, however, it was only a matter of minutes, and
upon arrival at assembly area ridge, the unit deployed for final attack. A simulated assault
brought the field exercise to an end.18
After the exercise came the final exams, in which instructors tested students on every
technique studied since arrival at the school. A passing grade on rope handling, rock-climbing,
rappelling, and the many other skills imparted during the class ensured that students could reach
graduation day. At a ceremony, the top student in the class was honored, and each student
received his diploma for six weeks of hard work. The Army believed that after completion of the
course, each graduate was fully equipped to “lead combat soldiers in the most difficult
conditions of the rugged north country,” having learned that the “sheer cliffs and bleak tundra of
the far north” were not “insurmountable obstacles to military operations.” The morning after the
ceremony, transport planes were on hand to return the students to their units across the United
States. Every summer, students would arrive to undergo a similar course of instruction.19
Though the techniques and skills imparted at the school remained fairly constant, the
name of the institution at which they were taught would not. In 1963, to reflect the Army’s desire
that cold weather training be expanded to include entire units as well as individuals, the Cold
Weather and Mountain School was renamed yet again, becoming the US Army Northern
Warfare Training Center (NWTC).20 As the NWTC settled into its mission, the winter
curriculum expanded its emphasis on skiing, with the slopes of the Black Rapids Training Site
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providing a forum for students to learn the “fundamentals of military downhill skiing” and “ski
fighting techniques,” as well as “methods of maneuvering while adapting to high winds, blowing
snow, and poor visibility.”21 Instructors for this portion of the training included prominent skiing
experts from the 10th Mountain Division, such as downhill skiing technical advisor Peter Gabriel,
and cross-country expert Hans Wagner.22 The ambitious continuing mission of the NWTC,
referred to by its students as the “Cool School,” was ably summed up by its motto: “We battle
cold and conquer mountains.”23
In the battle against the cold, however, the “Cool School” was not alone. While the
NWTC prepared men to face the elements, the Arctic Test Branch continued to work to provide
the Army with the necessary equipment to do so. Soon after the Big Delta post became Fort
Greely, the Arctic Test Branch was renamed as well, becoming the U.S. Army Arctic Test Board
in 1957.24 In 1962, Army reorganization brought the Arctic Test Board under the auspices of the
Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), and in 1964 it changed its name again, this time
becoming the Arctic Test Center (ATC). Twelve years later, in 1976, a final redesignation made
it the Cold Regions Test Center (CRTC).25
Through all these iterations, testing of equipment in the cold continued in its importance.
The procedures for implementing tests once the test center came under TECOM were rigorous:
First, when the Army wants to test and item and needs to see if it operates in
specific conditions, documents outlining the requirements for the test are forwarded to
test centers, in this case, CRTC. These documents give, among other things, a general
mission profile. ‘We examine the requirements and generate an outline test plan,’ Capt.
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Steven Alexander, CRTC Test Officer, said. ‘This tells how the test will be conducted,
the number of men needed, and projected costs. This plan is then sent to the Test and
Evaluation Command, where action is taken to provide the needed resources for testing,’
he continued.
TECOM will get a formal request for the test from the materiel developer, and
send CRTC a test design plan. This is an outline on how TECOM would like to test the
item. ‘We write a detailed test plan that gets into the nitty-gritty of how we will go about
testing the equipment,’ Alexander said. This goes to TECOM for approval. CRTC then
receives a test execution directive, which is TECOM’s formal order to perform the test.
When the equipment and required documentation arrives here, the manufacturer often
trains the test personnel to operate the equipment. The test is ready to begin.
‘The main responsibility of a test officer is to see if the item works as it’s
supposed to,’ Alexander said. ‘If an item is to function at -10 degrees, we check to make
sure it does.’ Alexander says the test officer cannot afford to become biased. ‘Doing so
will influence the final outcome of the tests,’ he said. CRTC’s mission is to report on the
equipment’s results, not to make it achieve results.26
In 1959, while still known as the Arctic Test Board, New York Times reporter Hanson
Baldwin noted that, while the Cold Weather and Mountain School sought to lessen the mystery
of the Arctic, the Test Board proudly maintained an emphasis on its Arctic mission and the
extremities at which it operated.27 At that time under the command of Col. D. E. Townsend, the
Test Board was not a part of the ALCOM structure, rather reporting to the Material
Developments Section of the Continental Army Command at Fort Monroe and ultimately to the
Army’s Research and Development section in Washington.28
As a part of research and development, the Test Board experimented with both new
pieces of equipment and modifications to existing items to increase efficiency and performance
in extreme cold. In 1959, the equipment undergoing tests ranged from something as simple as a
winter trigger for a rifle that would enable a soldier to fire while wearing mittens to a new
version of the Honest John field artillery rocket and launcher that would be lighter and do away
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with the necessity for an electric blanket to maintain the proper temperature for the propellant.29
Tests on a Fairchild Armalight light caliber rifle had found it efficient down to sixty degrees
below zero, while newly developed nickel cadmium batteries retained power in the same
temperature range.30
Each winter brought new items to the test facility, with the months from November to
March providing the best conditions to fulfill cold weather testing. By 1962, items undergoing
trials included the M-60 A-1 diesel tank, a battle tank weighing sixty tons and equipped with a
110-mm cannon, along with various classified munitions to be fired from it.31

Figure 1-Tanks Being Tested at ATC (Photo Courtesy Jon Dufendach)

In the infantry test section, the Test Board evaluated small arms, including a predecessor
/of the M-16 known as the AR-15, putting it up against the AK-47 and the M-14. An example of
the kinds of test performed was one where Test Board personnel fired the weapons through a set
of magnetic rings set up approximately 10 feet apart, and when a bullet entered the first ring it
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would activate a clock and when it exited the second the clock would stop, thus measuring the
bullet velocities at cold temperatures.32

Figure 2 - Ammunition Velocity Test (Photos Courtesy Jon Dufendach)

In some instances where the Army had a chance to compare the results of tests from an
artificial cold weather environment such as a laboratory and the natural cold to be found at Fort
Greely, the advantages of the Alaskan climate were clear. In 1972, tests of the M525 Point
Detonation Fuze in a cold chamber at Pictinny Arsenal in Dover, NJ had shown an alarmingly
high rate of duds (22.5%).33 Despite being stored in a frigid environment, exposure to a warmer
environment before firing was suspected to have caused a build up of frost, leading to the
misfires. In the constant temperatures of Alaska, the rate of duds dropped to one out of 100,
proving the superiority of testing under natural conditions.34
In addition to arms and ammunition, the Test Board under its various forms of
nomenclature also experimented with cold weather gear for soldiers in the Arctic. The winter of
1957 saw testers evaluating winter boots, with the standard Korean-war era model going up
against a new, improved model that had “more insulation and an air relief valve on the side to
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equalize pressure in the inner layers when worn aloft by airborne troops.”35 The importance of
proper footwear in the Arctic is hard to exaggerate; so, testers took the comparison very
seriously.

Figure 3- Perils of Inadequate Footwear (Photo courtesy Jon Dufendach)

Blocked for
Copyright Purposes
Figure 4- Cross Section of 'Bunny' Boot (www.bunnyboot.com)

Developed by podiatrist Tom Dee of the Navy Clothing and Textile Research Laboratory in
Natick, Massachusetts, “Bunny boots,” as the white boots would affectionately become known,
were found to be more efficient at keeping soldier’s feet warm and were subsequently adopted
for cold weather use.36
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Testing of vehicles was also a major focucs for the Test Board/Center. Trials ranged from
a cold start laboratory for standard Army vehicles to Arctic experimentation on more exotic
types of transport. Tests in the cold start lab sought to evaluate different vehicles’ performance
under extreme cold temperatures, and make the necessary alterations to ensure that they could be
relied upon to start in any temperature.37

Figure 5 – Top, Ambulance Cold Start Testing, Bottom, Cold Weather Test for Tank (Photos courtesy Jon Dufendach)

Other vehicles were less prosaic. In 1972, the only remaining surface effects vehicle
(SEV) from the conflict in Vietnam, a Bell SK-5, was tranported to Fort Greely for testing in an
Arctic environment.38 The SK-5 was essentially a hovercraft, also known as an air cushion
vehicle. The SK-5’s arrival at Greely and subsequent tests marked the first time an SEV was
evaluated in a true Arctic environment, and the first extensive evaluation over different northern
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terrains. The hope was that SEVs would prove a viable alternative to wheeled or tracked vehicles
for navigating the rugged and unforgiving Alaskan wildnerness. The SK-5 spent five months in
Alaska, and was tested across a wide variety of terrains, with the test crew also responsible for
evaluating the effect of the vehicle on Alaskan ecology.39
Despite the variety of activities underway at the Test Center, questions still arose about
whether Army cold weather readiness was sufficient. ATC commander Col. David J. Shumacher,
in 1972 questioned that readiness, asserting that, in his judgement, “the US Army’s ability to
conduct military operations in the cold regions of the world is far below what it should be.”40
Schumacher advocated an expanded mission for the ATC, arguing that increased testing was
needed in the intermediate cold category, which ranged to -25° F, or what would normally be
encountered in Europe and North America.41
It was to combat such fears of unreadiness and to apply the lessons learned from both the
NWTC and the ATC that almost yearly large-scale winter exercises took place in Alaska from
the late 1950s through the 1980s. Though theaters of operations often ranged far from Fort
Greely, the months leading up to the manuevers saw many troops visit the NWTC in preparation
for the exercises, and the equipment used often found its way to the ATC for further testing and
improvement.42 During the winters of 1950-51 and 1952-53, before the post was designated Fort
Greely, massive exercises involving thousands of troops took place in Alaska. The manuever
known as “Firestep” in 1951 tested the transport of airborne troops to support Alaskan defenses,
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with American planes using Canadian bases as stop-overs on their way north.43 A similar
exercise the following year also “involve[d] all armed forces in the territory, paratroopers of the
states-based Eleventh Airborne Division, and Tactical and Strategic Air Command planes from
the states.”44
Only a few months prior to the establishment of Fort Greely, Exercise ‘Snow Bird’
provided the largest test to date for the training and testing regimen at Big Delta, with more than
3,000 men involved in a manuever near Talkeetna that included the “largest mass drop ever
attempted in the area of the nearest invasion route from and to the Soviet Union.”45 One
important concept tested during ‘Snow Bird’ was the use of compacted snow runways, a new
technique for Arctic operations. ‘Snow Bird’ sought to build upon the previous Alaskan
exercises and push forward in Arctic experience.46
The following year, however, saw Fort Greely at the center of the “longest and coldest
Alaskan manuever” attempted to date.47 Exercise ‘Moosehorn’ dwarfed ‘Snow Bird’ in scope,
involving six combat battalions from Alaskan bases, and one battalion from Fort Lewis, WA,
seven thousand soldiers in all.48 Beginning near the end of January 1956, ‘Moosehorn’ sought to
“determine how well combat units could move, fight, and be supplied under extreme Arctic
conditions.49 As a feat of supply and troop movement, it was then unequaled in Alaskan military
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history, as a convoy of over 200 vehicles and more than 1,400 men traveled up the ALCAN
highway to reach Delta Junction for the manuever.50
The convoy, which departed Fort Lewis on January 4, got behind schedule even before it
reached the Canadian border due to snow in the Seattle area, and then, once into Canada, other
problems arose.51 Drowsiness caused several accidents, and caused other drivers to take wrong
turns in various towns along the route, while temperatures as low as -50° F made bivouacs along
the ALCAN more difficult and dangerous.52 Canadian military observers shephered their
movements through Canada very carefully to avoid unwelcome friction with residents, but in
Quesnel, BC, the town gun club presented the American unit with a record-large spread of
moose antlers in honor of the exercise name.53
The manuever was to take place on undeveloped Arctic terrain south of Fort Greely,
avoiding the use of the existing road net to truly test mobility in the Arctic. Once the battalion
from Fort Lewis had arrived at Greely, joining the battalions from other Alaskan installations,
mainly Fort Richardson near Anchorage, Maj. Gen. James F. Collins took command of the
troops for the duration of the manuever.54 The purpose of the exercise was two-fold: first, to test
the “ability of units to deliver timely and accurate fire under subarctic winter conditions,” and
second, “to determine the most effective method of resupplying large combat units under adverse
arctic conditions.”55
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Upon beginning the exercise, troops learned of the following “manuever situation:
aggressor forces of unkown strength have made airborne landings north of the Alaskan range. An
aggressor airborne unit has seized Delta Junction. Two battalion combat teams will immediately
engage the aggressor forces and destroy them.”56 In order to learn the most effective method of
resupply, one battalion would be resupplyed by air transport, and the other would receive
supplies via overland transport, in order to compare and evaluate the two methods.57 For both
columns, the main need was gasoline, as the mechanized vehicles that made up the bulk of the
units required an amazing amount of fuel to traverse the rough terrain. Even the most fuel
efficient mechanized vehicle, the Weasel, could only get about a mile and a half per gallon,
allowing a range of approximate one hundred miles per tank of fuel.58
As the two battalions moved out on their required forty-mile trek, temperatures were
below average for the area, with lows reaching -45° F and over two feet of snow blocking
progress for troops. Going out in front were the trailbreaking units on cross-country skis,
alternating between being pulled behind a mechanized vehicle (skijoring) and moving under their
own power to keep warm.59 For a part of the route, one battalion was able to travel on the frozen
Delta River and covered an impressive nineteen miles in the first day of the exercise.60 The
‘aggressor’ forces were encamped near the 2,400 foot Donnelly dome, an outpost of the Alaska
Range. Though the battalions carried as many supplies as they could manage, after the first
night’s bivouac they still needed to be resupplied. By the second morning, however, a fierce
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williwaw61 brought warmer temperatures (-20° F), but winds of up to seventy mph, thus
preventing both the air drops for the first battalion and the cat train62 for the second battalion
from leaving Fort Greely.63
By the end of the second day, the williwaw had subsided, allowing for the battalions to be
resupplied the following morning. The airdrop for the first battalion brought 2,000 C-rations,
2,000 assault packs, 6,800 gallons of fuel, and 14,500 lbs. of ammunition to the drop zone, thus
proving the feasiblity of air supply for a combat battalion during an arctic operation.64 Moving
overland, cat trains from the 271st Engineer Battalion delivered 4,000 gallons of gasoline, 2,000
C-rations, 2,000 assault packs, and 5,000 lbs. of ammuntion to the second battalion, illustrating
that overland supply from a not-too-distant location was also a feasible option.65 After receiving
their supplies, however, troops soon had to contest with plummetting temperatures, with lows
reaching nearly -70° F.66 Commanders attempted to strengthen their men’s resolve during the
frigid temps by pointing to the important place Alaskan troops held in defending the country
from possible Soviet attack, with one soldier involved in the manuever recalling being told, “You
are our first line of defense.”67
As the two battalions moved closer to the ‘aggressor,’ the first battalion initially made
contact with the ‘enemy,’ and the second pushed hard across the wilderness to take the ‘enemy’
by surprise in a flanking manuever. As the ‘aggressor’ retreated and U.S. forces pursued,
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elements of the 57th Helicopter Evacuation Company from Fort Sam Houston, TX evacuated
simulated casualties.68 The simulated battle ended with the defeat of the ‘aggressor’ forces, and
all the troops involved, a number which reached over half the men stationed in Alaska, returned
to Fort Greely after a successful test of both the ability of troops to fight in severe cold
conditions and of the ability to supply a large combat unit in the field during arctic weather
conditions both overland and through the air.69
As the Cold War continued, the Army continued in its mission to ensure that defense of
the Arctic was not the sole responsibility of any one specialized unit, but that all Army troops
were equally equipped to operate in cold weather and tropics, desert and tundra.70 To this end,
winter training exercises included troops from the Lower 48 as well as Alaskan units, thus
ensuring that in the event of a Soviet attack on Alaskan bases, reinforcements from the
Continental United States could operate effectively to retake them. These exercises utilized large
swaths of Alaskan wilderness, both within the military reservations of Forts Wainwright (Ladd
AFB until 1961, near Fairbanks), Richardson (near Anchorage), and Greely, and across
uninhabited federal lands throughout the state.
In early 1959, the Army conducted Exercise Caribou Creek in the area between the towns
of Talkeetna and Willow, with ‘Agressor’ forces mimicing a move south from Fairbanks to
menace bases near Anchorage.71 The US forces defending Anchorage consisted of elements of
the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, NC, who were gaining the cold weather experience

68

Ibid.
Ibid.
70
Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, “Caribou Creek,” Military Review 34, no. 5 (August 1959): 4.
71
Ibid., 3.
69

54

they would need if a legitimate Soviet threat required their presence in Alaska.72 Though the
exercise did not take place at Greely, the fort still played a role in this manuever, as some of the
officers and NCOs who from the 82nd who were to participate received cold weather training at
the Cold Weather and Mountain School prior to the arrival of the entire force.73 The ten day
exercise stressed again the problems of transportation, with engineers on both sides struggling to
forge roads through the trackless landscape, and also brought forward the difficulty of
determining positions in the wilderness.74
Each winter exercise contributed to an ongoing narrative in which the ‘Aggressor’ force
continued where the previous exercise had left off.75 Following a setback for the Aggressor in
1960 during Exercise ‘Little Bear,’ two winters later, other units from the 82nd took part in
1961’s Exercise “Willow Freeze.”76 An article commenting on that exercise in October of that
year noted that “the United States is not the only country engaged in cold weather and mountain
training. Other countries, including the Soviet Union…and Communist China have similar
training programs for their armed forces.”77 ‘Willow Freeze’ and ‘Little Bear’ both emphasized
the logistical problems of supplying a mobile force in the arctic landscape, building on the
experiences of Operation Moosehorn.78
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While 1960 and 1961 saw exercises that focused on logistics, 1962’s ‘Great Bear’
brought 8,000 men to the wilderness with a different goal in mind. Headquarters for the massive
exercise was at Fort Greely, and it emphasized the cold weather training of the many newcomers
to Alaska and field testing of vehicles and equipment.79 Most of the forces representing the
United States in the exercise came from Fort Devens, Massachuesetts, while special forces and
psychological warfare troops from North Carolina were also involved.80 According to press
coverage of the exercise, it was “the most important exhibition of sabre-rattling in Alaska since
the Second World War.”81 South of the headquarters at Greely, a massive tent city was
constructed at Tanacross to house the men involved in the maneuver, ironically on the site of an
abandoned hangar and airfield that was a remnant of the Lend-Lease program. As one media
observer noted, “Today, the appearance of Russian-piloted aircraft over Tanacross could be the
signal to change Great Bear from war game to war.”82
An impressive amount of detail went into the preparation of the ‘Aggessor’ forces, who
were said to hail from a fictitious nation, but were clearly meant to represent the Soviet Union,
despite assertions from the Army that they were “creating a fictitious state, not copying a real
one.”83 The First Battle Group, Ninth Infantry, permanently stationed in Alaska, took on the role
of ‘Aggressor,’ and, with assistance from representatives of the Army’s Aggressor Center in
Kansas, some of the troops were even taught elements of Esperanto, a created language made up
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of French, Spanish, German, and Italian, in order to test the U.S. forces prisoner of war skills.84
The ‘Aggressor’ forces also subjected their ‘enemy’ to “leaflets, radio broadcasts, and other
types of psychological persuaders.”85
In addition to the main exercise area, where U.S. forces experienced difficulties with
supply that handicapped their ability to move forward, Great Bear also saw the first participation
of Canadian troops in a joint Alaskan exercise since Yukon in 1948.86 The Canadian contribution
to Great Bear consisted of 150 men from Company “A” of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry second battalion.87 Their main task was far removed from the rest of the exercise, as
they were charged with liberating the town of Nome, just 140 miles from the Soviet Union, from
an ‘Aggressor’ force that captured it. Despite some setbacks due to weather, which prevented the
paratroopers from dropping in as planned, the Canadians successfully landed at the airport and
freed the citizens of Nome from the invading ‘enemy.’88 The purpose of this part of the exercise
was, according to one officer, “to show the people over there (Russia) that we are capable of
having tactical operations in that part of the world.”89
In the main exercise zone southeast of Fort Greely, some items being evaluated proved
promising, while others left something to be desired.90 Use of the Army’s new quick-serve meal
by thousands of troops revealed a significant obstacle to use in the Arctic: each meal required up
to seven quarts of water to prepare, far too much to be easily obtained from melted snow, the
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main water source for troops in the wild.91 Several experimental Army vehicles that used
methods such as pneumatic bags or oversized tires to counter the difficulties of Arctic travel
proved less than effective, while tests of the Canadian “Nodwell” vehicles that utilized tracks
were well received.92 General J. H. Michaelis, commanding general USARAL, noted the
importance of determining the most efficient vehicles for use in difficult terrain, stating, “The
key and important thing about Great Bear is that 60 percent of the Eurasian land mass is of
similar climate, temperature, and terrain to here.”93 Overall, the tests provided the Army with
extensive information that could then be further refined at the Arctic Test Board/Center. 94
The following year again saw 8,000 men involved in Exerecise ‘Timber Line’ descend on
Fort Greely.95 The 1963 winter exercise was intended to prepare U.S. and some Canadian troops
“to operate on a nuclear battlefield in a primitive northern area.”96 The introduction of tactical
nuclear weapons to the simulated Alaskan battlefield continued the following year in Exercise
‘Polar Siege,’ an even larger manuever that involved 10,000 troops, including a company from
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, which had already seen one company take part in
‘Great Bear.’97 Polar Siege provided troops with a highly realistic battlefield experience, with the
USARAL commander commenting that “there was only one fundamental difference
between…Polar Siege and Korea: no one was getting shot.”98 One other difference emerged, as
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the exercise ended when the “friendly forces” defeated the Aggressor with several simulated
nuclear blasts.99
The annual exercises continued in 1965, and in February Fort Greely again received
troops and aircraft participating in Exercise ‘Polar Strike.’100 Involving nearly 14,000 Canadian
and American troops, Polar Strike was the largest manuever held in Alaska up to that point.101
The goal of Polar Strike was to reevaluate the plans for “reinforcement of the Alaskan Command
by elements of the U.S. Strike Command, and for continued operations in Alaska.”102 The pattern
of massive yearly winter exercises, however, was broken in 1966.103 While Elmendorf Air Force
Base near Anchorage saw a massive increase in traffic as a staging area for troops and supplies
heading to the escalating conflict in Vietnam, the rest of Alaska saw its level of importance
decrease.104 The exercise planned for February 1966 “was called off because troops originally
committed are either in Vietnam, or being trained to go there while assault transports and MAC
planes are tied up. Insufficient forces for profitable exercises were available.”105 An indicator of
the importance the Army attributed to the winter manuevers in Alaska, however, can seen in the
fact that, despite troop commitments in Southeast Asia, a smaller scale exercise, named ‘Frontier
Assault,’ took place in 1967, with its headquarters at Fort Greely.106
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Even during the Vietnam War, similar exercises continued to refine and reinforce the
lessons for cold weather combat learned through experience since Exercise Yukon in 1948.
Exercises Acid Test I and Acid Test III (Acid Test II was cancelled) in 1969 and 1970 went
forward, and Acid Test III saw Canadian paratroopers drop onto Fort Greely as part of the
exercise that involved 4,700 men.107 Though Alaskan exercises between 1971 and 1975 focused
on the scenario of a downed aircraft traveling along the polar route, in 1975, training on a preVietnam War scale resumed in January 1975 with Exercise Jack Frost, which involved over
8,000 American and Canadian troops.108 The supply of creative exercise names had apparently
been exhausted, as exercises in subsequent years were known as Jack Frost 76, Jack Frost 77,
and Jack Frost 79.109
Fort Greely’s role as a site for large training exercises continued into the 1980s, with
large scale maneuvers named ‘Brim Frost’ taking place in 1983 and 1985. These events saw
hundreds of extra troops accomodated at Greely, with operations taking place in the surrounding
wilderness areas.110 These exercises, in conjunction with the continuing activities of the NWTC
and the CRTC, allowed Fort Greely to play a pivotal part in maintaining the Army’s readiness to
fight in cold weather, a function that an ever-present fear of a conflict with the Soviet Union
made especially vital.

107

Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3, 97; and The White Sands Missile Ranger, January

8, 1971, 1.
108

Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3, 97; and Office of History, Elmendorf AFB,
“Remembering Our Heritage 7-13 January,”
http://www.alaskawingcaf.org/Alaska%20Heritage/January7-13.pdf, accessed May 19, 2014.
109
Woodman, Duty Station Northwest, Vol. 3, 97.
110
Spc. Thom Cuddy, “Troops Prepare for Brim Frost ‘War,’” Buffalo, January 28, 1983, 4; and
Craig Staley, “Troops Arrive for Brim Frost ’85,” Buffalo, January 18, 1985, 1.

60

Chapter 4 - Cold War Science at Fort Greely
Fort Greely’s main contributions to the Cold War came in the realm of training and
testing, but the fort was also the site of several significant projects that integrated national
defense with significant scientific developments. The rationale for choosing Greely for these
projects differed in each case, but ultimately its location and remoteness figured heavily into the
decisions. First, Fort Greely was the home for the first field test site in the Army’s Nuclear
Power Program, as part of “the Cold War theme of nuclear energy for weapons and peaceful
uses.”1 In keeping with that theme, the Donnelly Flats area of the Fort Greely Air Drop and
Testing Area was the site for part of the nation’s first satellite missile warning system in response
to fears of Soviet ICBM capabilities.2 Though fears of nuclear attack dominated the Cold War
mindset, the Army also remained concerned over the possibility of Soviet deployment of
chemical and biological weapons, and throughout the late 1960s the ATC employed the Gerstle
River Test Site to conduct tests on various chemical and biological agents.3 These very different
activities serve to further highlight the Cold War context in which Fort Greely existed.
One of the most visible areas of Cold War scientific development was in the realm of
nuclear technology. The destructive power of nuclear weapons contrasted with the incredible
possibilities for advancement promised by the splitting of the atom. Even as he was announcing
the use of the atomic bomb against Japan on August 6, 1945, President Harry Truman alluded to
the constructive possibilities that nuclear research provided.4 For the Army, a new source for
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power was especially important, given the increasing number of complex systems for
communication and data processing being produced, and the concomitant “increased dependence
on electric power.”5 Research into the non-combat application of nuclear energy by the Army,
however, did not begin until six years later, when the establishment of the Army Office of
Research and Development allowed work to begin on the development of the Army Nuclear
Program. Colonel James Lampert, appointed as head of that program in August 1952, worked to
gain funding for the development of mobile reactors that would be able to produce electricity for
remote bases.6 No progress could occur, however, without approval from the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), as the Atomic Energy Act gave responsibility for and control over research
and development in the nuclear field to the AEC.7
As both head of the Army program and liaison to the AEC, Lampert faced some
significant hurdles to receiving the necessary funding. Resistance within the AEC to his
proposals largely stemmed from the fact that the Army could not demonstrate “a formal
requirement for a nuclear power plant, and the Commission was very reluctant to allocate funds
without such a justification.”8 To satisfy this shortcoming, Lampert and his assistant, Captain
William B. Taylor, made an examination of remote bases in Alaska and Greenland to compare
the cost of building a nuclear power plant with the cost of fuel deliveries for conventional power
generation, and concluded that the long term savings on fuel and delivery costs provided a
rationale for the development of nuclear power plants for the Army.9
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Even when presented with this finding and an open-ended proposal that indicated that the
Army was prepared to accept any scenario for control over and funding for the program that the
AEC deemed appropriate, the AEC still rejected the Army’s proposal, due in part to the AEC’s
desire to prevent Army competition with the nascent commercial nuclear power industry.10
Despite this setback, the Commission did allow research on the small reactors that would be
required for the Army’s proposal to proceed, and the uncertain future of atomic policy left hope
for a different decision in the near future.11 At the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, director Dr.
Alvin Weinberg was a strong supporter of nuclear power plants, and under his authority, the
laboratory became, “in effect, a technical consultant to Lampert and the Army’s Nuclear Power
Program.”12
Prospects for the Army Nuclear Program improved dramatically when Admiral Lewis
Strauss, adviser to President Eisenhower on energy matters and staunch supporter of the Army’s
proposals, was nominated Chairman of the AEC on June 24, 1953.13 In a move destined to
further smooth the path for Army nuclear power, the new chairman appointed the head of the
Army’s Office of Research and Development, General Kenneth D. Nichols, to the post of
General Manager of the AEC, effective November 1.14 Before taking up his new post, Nichols
endorsed the Nuclear Power Division’s recommendation that “the Army support the design of a
prototype nuclear power plant that would produce about 1,000 kilowatts of electrical power and
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sufficient additional steam to heat an arctic installation having a 200-man garrison.”15 In his
estimation, the validation for the program lay “in the fact that 75% of the total logistic support
required for such a station would be eliminated by the use of a nuclear power plant.” The
savings, he argued, would not be as significant in peacetime, but “in time of all-out-war, dollar
savings and the assurance of continued operations without dependence on regular deliveries of
oil would be an important justification.”16
The Nuclear Power Division, headed by Col. Lampert, produced a report in accordance
with Nichols’ ideas which proposed that the Army build two nuclear power plants: the first a
prototype in the United States that should cost less than $5 million, and the second a field unit to
be located in the arctic and completed by late 1958.17 Unsurprisingly, the first obstacle to
reappear was the question of funding, as the DOD assumed the AEC would provide the budget,
while the AEC asserted that it had no funds available and indicated its expectation that the Army
would finance the necessary projects.18 The determination of both sides to move forward with
the project, however, smoothed the way, and on July 21, 1954, the DOD and the AEC reached an
agreement on joint funding under which “the AEC agreed to pay for the cost of the reactor and
associated equipment, with the Army paying for the cost of the conventional portions of the
plant.”19
Col. Lampert decided that the first prototype should not be located in a remote area, due
to the untested nature of the technology, and the first Army nuclear reactor was instead
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constructed at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.20 The construction contract was awarded to ALCO
Products in December 1954, and construction began in October 1955 with an anticipated
completion date in early 1957.21 The first electricity at the plant was produced on April 15, 1957,
and the plant became “one of the first reactor systems in the United States to supply power to an
electrical grid.”22 In addition to testing the prototype reactor for the Army Nuclear Power
Program, this reactor, designated SM-1 (S- Stationary, M- Medium power range, 1- First of its
kind), provided a training ground for Army nuclear technicians as the program expanded.23
The first expansion of the program was made official on December 18, 1957, when the
Army announced that it had authorized construction of the program’s first field reactor at Fort
Greely.24 The choice of Fort Greely, however, had been made soon after the construction
contract for the Fort Belvoir prototype was awarded. In early 1955, the Army Reactor Branch
chose Greely because it would “satisfy military requirements for electricity and heat with logistic
efforts greatly reduced relative to existing conventional systems.”25 In addition, a reactor at Fort
Greely would also “serve as a transitional test facility to gain operational experience under
conditions of extreme temperature (+90 degrees to -60 degrees) in order to evaluate the nuclear
power concept under arctic field conditions,” and thus would provide data that would
“complement rather than duplicate that gained from the Fort Belvoir plant.”26
The Army’s initial plan for the reactor at Fort Greely called for construction to begin in
1957, but the proposal met with some questions from the Bureau of the Budget regarding
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coordination with the AEC and the military necessity of a nuclear power plant at Greely.27 This
delayed the timeline for the project, and after the initial delay, other obstacles arose. The Office
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) questioned the necessity of
building a reactor at both Fort Greely and a site that the Air Force had proposed, the air station at
Sparrevohn, Alaska.28 The Air Force could demonstrate a much more pressing need for a nuclear
power plant, as all fuel to generate electricity for the extremely isolated base had to be brought in
by air, a process made dangerous by a short runway.29 Col. Lampert acknowledged the Air
Force’s need, but argued that the relative accessibility of Fort Greely was a point in its favor, for,
though it was not an economic necessity, it was preferable to have the first field reactor at a site
that was not only accessible by air in case of unforeseen difficulties.30
In addition to uncertainty in Washington, the USARAL Commander opposed the project,
feeling that including it in his budget would take funding away from other areas in Alaska. By
including funding for the plant in the Corps of Engineers budget rather than the USARAL
budget, the Chief of Engineers avoided that issue, and in June 1957, the project finally received
approval from the Defense Department.31 The project was sent out for bids among construction
firms experienced with the Alaskan environment, and on April 26, 1958, Peter Kiewit Sons’
Construction Company out of Seattle received the contract to build the plant for $4,897,217.32
Kiewit then subcontracted the nuclear components of the plant to ALCO Products, the same
company that had created the design for both the Greely plant and the SM-1 at Fort Belvoir.33
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Construction began at Fort Greely in June 1958, but the short summer season only
allowed a small percentage of the work to be completed before winter came, and work had to be
suspended. Significant progress was made when work began again in the spring of 1959, but in
the middle of the construction season, an Alaska-wide strike of all construction workers and
craftsmen brought work on the plant to a standstill. No resolution came until mid-September, too
late for work to resume that year, and the project was pushed an entire year behind schedule.34

Figure 1- Reactor Vessel 35

Complicating the construction schedule was the complexity of transportation, with major
components of the reactor arriving via ship to the port of Valdez, while other construction
materials made the long trek up the Alcan Highway to reach Fort Greely. Even once the building
was completed, problems with various delicate technical systems continued to delay the
project.36
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It was not until March 13, 1962 at 12:38 AM that the SM-1A reactor at Fort Greely
finally reached criticality.37 Before the plant could fulfill it mission to produce 4,000 kilowatts of
energy, 2,000 of which would go to producing electricity and 2,000 to heat for the base, it first
was subjected to an intense round of tests.38 Those tests continued for nearly a month and a half,
ensuring that both the reactor and the steam system that would operate the turbines for
generating electricity were functioning properly.39 Once the tests were complete, the reactor
would provide “nearly all the power Fort Greely use[d] during the winter months,” according to
Major Richard Harris, Officer in Charge of the reactor.40 The reactor began producing electricity
for the fort on April 23, 1962, and soon, the Fort Greely power plant had an opportunity to
supply power to the local community as well when vandals damaged the local power system.41

Figure 2- SM-1A Power Plant at Fort Greely42
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Though the first years of operation involved some minor issues, it was, by and large, a
reliable source of heat and power for the base for the next ten years, also stepping in to provide
power for local Golden Valley Electric Association customers whenever the vagaries of Alaskan
weather, including the very high winds that are characteristic of the Delta Junction area, caused
disruptions in power service.43 A problem discovered in 1967 came close to causing the
premature shutdown of the plant, but instead led to an important advance for the nuclear
industry. Radiation from the core had caused the metal of the pressure vessel to become brittle,
but the Army’s R & D program discovered that annealing the steel would counteract the
problem, a new technique that would have implications for the rest of the industry.44
Though the annealing of the reactor vessel and the installation of a new steam generator
in 1969 extended the life of the plant, changes were in store that would spell the end for it and
the Army Nuclear Power Program as a whole. By the late 1960s, the program had achieved most
of its goals. It had successfully developed and operated both prototypes and field plants,
including a barge-mounted reactor for the Panama Canal Zone.45 The Vietnam War, however,
changed funding priorities, and the reactor development program was a victim. “The first setback
occurred in 1968 when funds were not authorized for the continuation of the ML-1 [Mobile,
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Low-Power, 1] development. This marked the beginning of the curtailment of program
funding.”46
By late 1970, “the Chief of Engineers decided that the SM-1A had successfully
completed its mission of demonstrating the feasibility of building and operating a nuclear power
plant in a remote, arctic environment.”47 Therefore, “as part of the reduction of nonessential
activities,” in late 1971, the Chief of Engineers ordered the permanent shutdown and
decommissioning of the plant, to take place no later than the scheduled depletion of the reactor’s
fourth fuel core in 1973.48 The decommissioning began on March 14, 1972 after the plant was
shut down for the last time. The decommissioning process involved the removal of the nuclear
materials and equipments, and the entombment of the reactor vessel in concrete and grout.49 The
experiment had been a success, and the SM-1A reactor at Fort Greely had been “important in
Army testing of small nuclear power plants” and in forwarding the technology for extending the
life of nuclear power plants.50
As promising as the peaceful use of nuclear technology seemed for the future of the
Army in the 1950s, the very real threat posed by nuclear weapons was an overwhelming concern
for the Army and Air Force. From the beginning, Alaska received significant attention from
planners concerned with providing as much advance warning of a potential attack as was
possible. While the primary delivery method for a nuclear attack was still via bombers,
construction began in Alaska on the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, a series of highly
advanced radar and communication stations that stretched across the northern coastline of Alaska
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and Canada to detect any Soviet attack before it even reached North America.51 Completely
operational by 1957, the DEW Line would prove inadequate almost as soon as it was completed,
as rapidly advancing ballistic missile technology dramatically shortened the amount of warning
the system could provide.52
The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), consisting of three large, ground
based radars in Alaska, Greenland, and England, was the U.S. response to the launch of Sputnik
in 1957.53 Though this system was stronger than the DEW Line, a missile launched from the
Soviet Union would hit its target in only thirty minutes, placing a premium on advance warning
of any launch.54 As early as 1948, a group of researchers at the Naval Research Laboratory were
investigating the possibility of detecting the infrared radiation given off by missiles at launch and
during flight.55 By 1955, William Kellog and Sidney Passman of the Rand Corporation, under
contract with the Air Force, had produced a paper investigating the possible application of
infrared missile detection to a satellite missile warning system.56
In 1956, the Air Force tasked the Lockheed corporation with building a photographic
reconnaissance satellite, and Lockheed proposed further military applications of satellite
technology, including a proposal “for a constellation of accurately positioned polar orbiting
satellites, which would sweep over the vast Sino-Soviet land mass and instantly report any
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detection of missile launches to one of three strategically located ground stations.”57 This idea
was highly attractive to the Air Force, and “as a result, before the end of 1957, Lockheed’s
proposal became Subsystem G of Weapons System 117L (WS-117L), the overall Defense
Department space-based reconnaissance and surveillance program.”58 By November 5, 1958,
Subsystem G, which had come under the responsibility of the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA), was decreed to become an independent project.59 The public first received
notice of the proposed system when the ARPA director announced it at a press conference on
December 3, 1958, giving it the name “Missile Defense Alarm System,” or “MIDAS.”60
In March 1959, a report from the President’s Science Advisory Committee looked
favorably on the BMEWS and infrared detection via U2 flights, but balked at the cost of
construction of MIDAS and advised that there was “insufficient evidence concerning the
implementation of such a system to justify its construction at this time.”61 Despite the official
hesitancy, construction began on the ground stations that would receive data from the satellites
once they were in orbit in 1959.62 Since MIDAS was intended to complement the BMEWS, the
three ground stations were to be located near the BMEWS radar stations. While the station in
Greenland was placed at the same location as the radar site, the Alaskan Donnelly Flats site was
approximately 100 miles east of the BMEWS radar station at Clear, Alaska.63
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Figure 3- Map of Fort Greely area64

Apparent factors behind the choice to locate the Alaskan ground station on the Fort
Greely reservation included distance from the Soviet Union (at least 600 nautical miles was
required), and access to communications networks. Most important, though, was complete
isolation from electrical signal interference.65 The Donnelly Flats site combined sufficient
freedom from interference with access to the military communications network in the form of a
concurrently constructed BMEWS Rearward Communications site in the area and ease of
support due to close proximity to the road and rail networks and the existing military
infrastructure of Fort Greely.66 To ensure a lack of electrical interference, the Air Force had the
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Bureau of Land Management cancel the land claims of four Alaskans for property near the site,
and ensure that no further claims could be filed in the area.67
Though MIDAS was an Air Force project, the Army Corps of Engineers had
responsibility for the details of the Alaskan section of the undertaking, and they chose the site
and undertook construction. In contrast to the foot-dragging in Washington over the proposal,
progress in Alaska was surprisingly rapid. “The Air Force contacted the Alaska District of the
Corps of Engineers on April 10, 1959. Initial site selection was complete by April 29th. Facility
design began on May 18, site surveys were done by June 1, and design review was complete by
June 27. The project went out for bid on July 2, within ninety days of initiation.”68 Work on the
technical facilities in the summer of 1959, and contractors managed to get the site prepared and
foundations under way before winter forced a halt to construction.69 Once it resumed in the
spring of 1960, it ran smoothly until it was completed in October of the same year.70
While Alaskan contractors worked feverishly to complete the ground support facilities
for MIDAS, scientists were also hard at work, attempting to launch the satellites that were the
essential part of the program. The first attempt on February 26, 1960 failed, with media
reporting, “A blazing Atlas missile boosted the 2¼ ton Midas satellite into position for a lowflying orbit, but the second stage did not separate and the entire assembly was consumed by
friction heat as it dived back into the atmosphere 2,500 miles down range.”71 In May, the launch
of MIDAS 2 was successful, and the satellite settled into an equatorial orbit soon after liftoff.72
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The Air Force planned to test the ability of the infrared sensors to detect a missile’s heat
signature by launching a Titan ICBM while the MIDAS satellite was in orbit, but after two days,
the satellite’s communications link failed.73
Technical problems continued to plague the program, but the perceived threat of the
Soviet Union’s growing ICBM fleet caused NORAD and the Air Defense Command to urge the
acceleration of the MIDAS program.74 The two days of successful communication from orbit
proved that “infrared radiation could be detected at sufficient distances by the sensors, for while
the satellite tumbled it picked up a variety of infrared returns, including stellar returns.”75
Questions persisted within the defense community, however, about the ability of the infrared
sensors to differentiate between the radiation from an actual missile launch and background
stellar radiation, as well as “natural infrared anomalies such as volcanoes, forest fires, and the
reflection of sunlight on clouds.”76
The continued difficulties, as well as the formidable cost of the program led to high level
debates over whether MIDAS should continue on a path toward full implementation as planned,
or if its operational date should be indefinitely delayed pending significant progress in research
and development.77 MIDAS 3 reached orbit successfully in July 1961, and it became the first
MIDAS satellite to pass over Soviet territory on its second orbit.78 The transmitting equipment,
however, again failed soon after launch, and in 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
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“directed the Air Force to reconfigure MIDAS as a research and development program. Instead
of following its planned progression from an experimental to an active warning system, MIDAS
would test concepts and system improvements but would not become operational.”79
This official designation of MIDAS as an R & D program was soon followed by several
highly successful launches in 1963. The May 9 launch of MIDAS 7 provided significant positive
results, including successful detection of POLARIS, MINUETMAN, and TITAN missiles
launched by the Air Force to coincide with the MIDAS satellite orbit.80 The success came too
late to revive the operational aspect of the program, but as Air Force General Bernard Schriever
noted in 1960, “…in a technological war of the kind we are now waging the laboratory, the
assembly line, and the test range comprise the combat theater. Research and development has
become almost an operational function, inseparable from the strategic performance of the
systems which it produces.”81
On the ground in Alaska, the MIDAS station also produced its share of controversy,
though on a much smaller scale. When contractors assigned to the project first arrived in the
Delta Junction area, they were housed and fed in various local lodging establishments, providing
a major boost to the small town’s economy, already highly dependent on the military.82 Then,
shortly after this highly desirable (in the view of local business owners) arrangement began, it
was terminated, and civilian contractors were required to move to newly built housing on Fort
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Greely, prompting a flurry of letters to the desk of Senator Ernest Gruening in Washington.83
Sen. Gruening dutifully made inquiries on behalf of his constituents, and after the Army
Legislative Liaison Office directed him to the Air Force, since the MIDAS project was under
their authority, finally received word the following summer that under the contract with Philco
Corporation for operation of the MIDAS site, housing the employees on base in the barracks
built for that purpose was significantly cheaper than housing in the community.84
These coveted guests were the force that actually ran the site, which required an
estimated staff of 99 technicians for the various technical tasks, including automatic tracking
radar technicians, communications technicians, data processing technicians, instrumentation
technicians, and precision measuring equipment technicians.85 In addition to the technical
positions, the site also required operations and maintenance staff to keep the delicate advanced
equipment running throughout the frigid Alaskan winters, as well as maintain the air
conditioning systems that were necessary to keep the computers on the site cool during the
summer.86
The role this staff played in MIDAS was essential for both the initial operational
aspirations of the program and the critical technological advancements that were the ultimate
outcome. The purpose of a satellite ground station was to keep track of the satellite as it orbited
the earth and to receive signals from the satellite containing the information the satellite was
launched to collect.87 To perform that task, the Donnelly Flats station was equipped with a
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receiver building containing a sixty-foot antenna dish covered by a 110-foot diameter rigid
radome.88
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Figure 4- Receiver Building 289

There were three such buildings constructed at the site, but the antenna was only installed in
Receiver Building Two, due to the alteration in the outlook of the program between the site’s
initial construction and design and its completion.90 The site also included a power plant to
provide the specialized power needs of the tracking and data processing equipment, a vehicle
warm storage building, and the center of the operation, the Administration and Data Acquisition
Building.91
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Figure 5- Site Plan92

The first phase of operations at the site, from 1961-1963, consisted mostly of preparation
and work on the satellite support equipment, since very few of the launches during this time were
successful. Despite the lack of active satellite support, however, the technicians at Donnelly Flats
still engaged in crucial activities, as most of the equipment they were dealing with was brand
new technology that was still full of glitches. One of the technicians who worked on the timing
equipment at the site during this period reported that he “spent every day trying to get it
operational.”93 These efforts were no doubt crucial “to later improvements in MIDAS and its
successor systems.” 94
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After the launch of MIDAS 9 on July 18, 1963, the MIDAS program became primarily
focused on R & D, and no more launches under that name were attempted. Consequently, the
Donnelly Flats station went into caretaker status by some time in 1964.95 The results of the
MIDAS 7 and MIDAS 9 satellites, however, had provided sufficient support for the idea of a
satellite missile warning system that a successor program, known as Program 461, went ahead in
1965 and 1966, with its first launch in June 1966.96 The Donnelly Flats station was reactivated to
support these new launches, and it experienced its most active period of operation in actual
support of satellites, beginning on April 6, 1966.97 It remained active in support of these satellites
until November 1967, when it was closed permanently, due to the impending introduction of
Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites.98 The DSP program employed three satellites in a
geostationary orbit about 22,300 miles above the equator, making use of the advancements in
satellite communications technology that had come about in part due to the MIDAS program.99
In addition to the systems the U.S. government sought to put in place to protect its
citizens from a possible nuclear attack, the threats posed by other types of weapons were never
forgotten. Inspiring fears second only to nuclear weapons were the assumed chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) capabilities of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of World War II,
the Allied nations discovered massive German stockpiles of nerve agents that had never been
used, but were the subject of great interest, especially to the Soviets, who dismantled chemical
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manufacturing facilities and transferred them to the Soviet Union.100 Though U.S. intelligence
did not have a clear picture of the Soviet capabilities, U.S. planners were determined to be ready
for an attack. The Stevenson Report in 1950 concluded, “the United States should be prepared to
defend itself against biological warfare and to wage biological warfare offensively.”101 To
facilitate this, the United States engaged in extensive research on both biological and chemical
weapons as the Cold War deepened, leading to the mass-production of sarin and VX nerve gas,
as well as hundreds of open-air tests of biological agents for use against both crops and
personnel.102
CBW tests occurred in numerous places around the United States and its territories, and
as with all weapons considered for use in a war against the Soviet Union, the question of how
these agents would fare in an arctic environment was of greatest importance to U.S. planners.
Throughout the 1950 and 1960s, tests of CBW went on at Fort Greely, with the activity taking
place on the Gerstle River Test Site, about 30 miles southeast of the main fort, and in the Delta
Creek area west of the Delta River far from inhabited areas.103 “Limited cold weather
dissemination testing of GB [Sarin] and VX was conducted in this area,” including munitions
from 1955-1957 and mines in the winter of 1960-61.104
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As part of a massive review of the nation’s armed forces conducted after President
Kennedy took office in 1961, a chemical and biological warfare review known as Project 112
took place. “As part of the Project 112 review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff convened a working
committee that recommended a research, testing, and development program for chemical and
biological weapons. To oversee this program, the Deseret Test Center was established at Fort
Douglas, Utah, in 1962.”105 Under the authority of the Deseret Test Center (DTC), various tests
of sarin and VX gases, as well as biological agents such as tularemia, were conducted at Gerstle
River. DTC Test 63-3, known as “Whistle Down” tested “the existence, nature, and extent of the
hazard from Sarin and VX nerve agents on environmental clothing, snow, and frozen ground” by
exposing manikins to the downwind effects of Sarin-filled munitions and a VX-filled M23
landmine.106
Similar tests on VX and Sarin took place between 1963 and 1966, investigating the
properties and behavior of these nerve agents in snow and cold temperatures, given code names
such as “Elk Hunt,” “Devil Hole,” “Dew Point,” “Swamp Oak,” and “Sun Down.”107 Officials
were also concerned with biological agents, and from November 30, 1963 to January 8, 1964,
DTC personnel carried out tests on the airborne spread of biological agent in arctic conditions,
using relatively harmless bacteria to simulate a more dangerous release.108 The test known as
“Red Cloud,” carried out between November 1966 and February 1967 investigated the biological
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decay rate and animal infectivity of the bacteria responsible for tularemia, also known as rabbit
fever, at extremely low temperatures.109
For the most part, these tests were carried out with the utmost of caution, and considering
the extreme remoteness of the actual test sites, the minimum of danger to civilian populations.
One incident from the winter of 1965-66 caused significant alarm in the community when word
got out several years later, however. As later inquiries into the matter by Alaska’s senators would
uncover, during an effort to clean up and dispose of excess toxic munitions that had been part of
an investigation into storage stability in an arctic environment in late 1964, a quantity of those
munitions were placed on the ice of a small lake in the Gerstle River Test Site, and then, due to a
delay in the process, forgotten.110 When the ice on the lake melted in the spring, the munitions
sank to the bottom and remained there until 1968, when efforts to retrieve them began.111 ATC
and DTC forces worked during the summer of 1969 to drain the lake and recover all the
potentially toxic materials.112 Despite local concerns, no apparent contamination of the area
occurred, and the intensive clean-up efforts seemed to ensure the ecological security of the
land.113
President Nixon’s November 1969 pledge to end U.S. testing and development of all
biological and most chemical weapons, however, ended the Alaskan testing. Nixon swore that
the United States would never engage in biological warfare, even in response to an attack in
kind, and limited chemical weaponry to things such as riot control agents and the chemical
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defoliants in use in Vietnam.114 The clean-up effort, spurred in part by intense scrutiny from
local residents and Alaskan politicians, continued into the early 1970s, but Fort Greely’s
subjection to such agents had come to an end, without evident harm to the environment or
civilians.115
In many ways, the Cold War was a struggle of scientists, and Fort Greely was the site of
several projects that were thought to be of immense value to the nation in its fight against
communism.116 Though the harnessing of the atom for non-combat military purposes would not
fundamentally alter the Army, the nuclear power plant at Fort Greely “contribute[d] to the
advancement of nuclear power to generate electricity for peaceful purposes,” and proved that it
could be a viable option even in a cold, remote area, as well as allowing for the development of
an important technique for extending the useful life of nuclear reactors.117 Fortunately, there was
never a need to protect the nation against the other application of the power of the atom, but the
MIDAS program and its outpost on Fort Greely greatly advanced the nation’s ballistic missile
tracking and warning capabilities, and provided a foundation for programs that would give
reassurance to millions of Americans who lived in fear of a nuclear attack. Likewise, deadly
chemical and biological agents were never employed against U.S. troops or civilians, but the
tests conducted at Gerstle River supplied crucial knowledge about how those agents behaved in
the open air, as well as how the environment could be cleansed of their presence. Scientific
advancements that took place at Fort Greely were an innate product of the Cold War, and help to
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solidify its place in the history of that struggle and provide further examples of the inescapable
Cold War context in which it existed.
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Conclusion
Given the inextricable links between Fort Greely and the era of the Cold War, it was
inevitable that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the ideological struggle between
superpowers would significantly affect the mission and future of the installation. The end of the
Cold War closely coincided with a drastic round of military base closures under a procedure
known as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). In the first round of cuts in 1991, a federal
commission recommended the closure of twenty-four Army, Navy, and Air Force bases in
fifteen states.1 Fort Greely’s turn came in 1995, when the BRAC Commission report to the
President recommended a major realignment. Headquarters for the CRTC and the NWTC were
to be transferred to Fort Wainwright in Fairbanks, and the garrison greatly reduced to a minimal
staff to support only essential missions. The NWTC had already been halved in size, and the base
would continue to operate only as an auxiliary of Fort Wainwright.2 Though the functions for
which the base had been established would continue to some degree, Fort Greely itself would
essentially cease to exist.
This state of affairs continued until 2001, but newly elected president George W. Bush
made an important decision that would bring Fort Greely back into the forefront of national
defense. The perception of a continued threat from ICBMs launched from a rogue state such as
North Korea persuaded President Bill Clinton in 1996 to propose a Ballistic Missile Defense
system that would be designed to intercept and shoot down any incoming missiles that threatened
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the nation.3 One site put forward to host these defensive missiles was the recently realigned Fort
Greely. Setbacks in testing of the technology delayed the program, and eventually Clinton was
persuaded to put off the final decision on the program until after the 2000 election, placing the
decision in the hands of his successor.4
The program was highly sensitive diplomatically, since it would violate provisions of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed in 1972. Despite the international issues the program raised,
Bush was determined to go forward, and in August 2001 work began at Fort Greely in
preparation for the installation of missile silos to house the nation’s interceptors.5 With the work
on the missile system came a partial resurrection of sorts for the fort. Though greatly reduced in
size from its Cold War levels, Fort Greely regained its independence from Fort Wainwright,
though the vast majority of Greely’s former acreage remained with Wainwright.6 In 2005,
Headquarters for the CRTC returned to Fort Greely.7
Though the current Fort Greely does not boast the same area or breadth of mission that it
enjoyed during the height of the Cold War, the current level of uncertainty concerning the
missile capabilities of rogue states has ensured that it once again has a pivotal role in the defense
of the United States. From its earliest beginnings as an airstrip carved from the wilderness in the
midst of war, the land along the Richardson Highway just south of the junction of the Delta and
Tanana Rivers has been occupied by a force that had an important part to play in the nation’s
security and ability to fight wars.
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Given Russia’s historical relationship with Alaska, it is fitting that from its earliest
incarnation Fort Greely was intimately intertwined with U.S./Russian relations. The location’s
role in U. S. wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union ultimately aided in defeating the Nazis,
but within two years of the end of that conflict, the area would host troops undergoing training
designed to ensure their ability to defeat their former allies in an anticipated war. As the Cold
War steadily grew colder, the icy plains of Delta Junction saw a permanent military installation
sprout up from the hasty accommodations of wartime; an installation whose very existence was
dedicated to preparing all possible U.S. forces to resist an attacker who specialized in winter
fighting.
The Soviet Union’s threat to the West lent urgency to every lesson in skiing or making
shelter in the snow covered north, or traversing a glacier. Every rigorous test of a weapon or
vehicle’s cold weather performance had at its core the understanding that a malfunction due to
the cold could one day cost a soldier his life. As each winter saw massive groups of soldiers
arrive in Alaska to practice the defense of America’s northernmost outposts, the thought of when
those exercises might become reality motivated thousands of men to give urgency to the faux
battle at hand.
Without the looming menace of the Soviet Union, a state of the art nuclear power plant
would likely never have found its way to one of the Army’s remotest bases, nor would massive
computers have resided under the shadow of Donnelly Dome, receiving signals from satellites
that passed thousands of miles overhead. What purpose would there have been for men in
protective gear to fire shells loaded with deadly chemicals across the Alaskan wilderness?
Without the Cold War, scientific inquiries might never have found their way to Fort Greely, and
without Fort Greely, the progress of technology to fight the Cold War would have been less sure.
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Contrary to the Army’s conclusion that Fort Greely had only negligible historical
significance, and therefore did not merit preservation under the National Historic Register Act,
this thesis offers a significantly different assessment. The Arctic Test Branch, the Arctic Test
Board, the Arctic Test Center, the Cold Regions Test Center. The Army Arctic School, the Army
Arctic Indoctrination School, the Cold Weather and Mountain School, the Northern Warfare
Training Center. These organizations, under all their names prepared the U.S. Army to fight
battles that thankfully never occurred. The lack of implementation of the lessons taught at Fort
Greely does not lessen their important contribution to the history of Cold War America. As
unassuming as Fort Greely’s appearance is, its historical importance is today mirrored by its
contemporary relevance to national defense. A military installation birthed with and shaped by
the ideological struggle with Communism, Fort Greely’s past cannot be understood apart from its
Cold War context.
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